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CRIMINAL LAW
LIBERTY INTERESTS IN THE PREVENTIVE
STATE: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND
SEX OFFENDER COMMUNITY
NOTIFICATION LAWS
WAYNE A. LOGAN*
"Am I not what I am, to some degree, in virtue of what others think and
feel me to be?"
I. INTRODUCTION
Sex offenders are the scourge of modem America, 2 the "ir-
redeemable monsters" who prey on the innocent.3  Although
this revulsion is perhaps now more widespread and more acute,
it is not unprecedented in the annals of American justice. Dur-
ing the twentieth century alone, those accused or convicted of
sex offenses have been the subject of repeated social control
strategies, including the "sexual psychopath" laws in effect na-
tionwide since the 1930s, which segregate offenders in mental
institutions. 4 For its part, the U.S. Supreme Court has been no-
.Assistant Professor, State University of NewYork at Albany, School of CriminalJustice. BA.,
Wesleyan University; MA, State University of New York at Albany; J.D., University of Wisconsin.
I thank Professors James Acker, David Logan, and Ron Wright for their thoughtful comments
and suggestions in the preparation of this Article.
'SR IsAiAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERIY 155 (1969).
'See e.g., ADAM SAMPSON, ACTS OFABUSE: SEX OFFENDERS AND THE CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM
124 (1994) ("The vehemence of the hatred for sex offenders is unmatched by attitudes to any
other offenders."); Peter Davis, The Sex Offender Next Door, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE,July 28, 1996, at
20 (analogizing released sex offenders to lepers).
'David van Biema, Burn Thy Neighbor, TIME,July 26, 1993, at 58.
'See MarnaJ. Johnson, Comment, Minnesota's Sexual Psydwopathic Personality and Sexually Dan-
gerous Person Statute: Throwing Away the Key, 21 WM. MTCHEiLL L. REV. 1139, 1141-47 (1996) (de-
scribing origins of sexual psychopath statutes and Supreme Court's case law relating thereto).
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tably unreceptive to constitutional challenges brought against
such strategies,5 signaling its plain deference to the police power
of states to target sex offenders with invasive and often quite
novel interventions.6
In 1997, for instance, in Kansas v. Hendricks,7 the Court up-
held the nominally "civil" scheme used by Kansas to involuntar-
ily commit "sexually violent predators" after their release from
prison. While observing that "freedom from physical restraint
'has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause,', 8 eight justices reaffirmed that this "liberty in-
terest is not absolute."9 The states, the Hendricks Court empha-
sized, should be afforded latitude to formulate their own
methods of controlling sex offenders. 10
This article addresses yet another police power strategy used
by governments seeking to control sex offenders, a strategy that
' See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 375 (1986) (denying claims based on due process
and the violation of the privilege against self-incrimination against an Illinois law that permitted
indefinite "dvil confinement" of sex offenders in state maximum security prisons); Minnesota ex
rel Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 276 (1940) (denying due process and equal protec-
tion challenges to Minnesota's "sexual psychopath" law, which diverted suspects to treatment
facilities in lieu of prison). But see Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967) (striking down
on procedural due process grounds a sex offender sentence enhancement on reasoning that
"the invocation of the [Colorado] Sex Offenders Act means the making of a new charge leading
to criminal punishment").
Although significant for its deviation from the Court's otherwise uniform approval of sex of-
fender laws, Speht is also distinctive for its express emphasis on the criminal (not civil) nature of
the proceeding at issue, and the undisputed greater concern for due process protections in
criminal proceedings. As the courts have overwhelmingly found, registration and notification
provisions are "civil" regulations, thus not triggering the full panoply of constitutional protec-
tions available to those in the criminal cross-hairs of the State. See infra note 17 and accompany-
ing text.
' "Police power" involves the State's capacity to enact laws "promot[ing] the health, peace,
morals, education, and good order of the people." Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
See also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) ("There is no doubt that preventing
danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal.").
'521 U.S. 346 (1997).
'Id. at 356 (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
'See id. at 360.
Justice Ginsburg was the sole dissenter on the question of whether the Kansas Act violated
substantive due process. Id at 373 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg did, however,
join three of her colleagues-Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Souter-in dissenting on the ground
that the Act amounted to "punishment," imposed retroactively, in violation of the Ex Post Facto
Clause. Id. See generally Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and theJuiispudence of Punish-
men, 35 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1261, 1270-74 (1998).
'0 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358-59. See also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 375 (1986) (upholding
Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act on reasoning that "'(t]he essence of federalism is that
states must be free to develop a variety of solutions to problems and not be forced into a com-
mon, uniform mold' of the sort urged by petitioner'") (citation omitted).
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departs from previous historic efforts oriented toward physical
constraints: the use of sex offender community notification
laws." Pursuant to these laws, sex offenders (typically upon re-
lease from prison) live out their lives beyond the walls of con-
finement, but they do so with the knowledge that not just the
State-but also their fellow citizens-are aware of their criminal
history and whereabouts in the community.1 2  While the practi-
cal efficacy of such regimes has been seriously questioned,1 not
least for the sense of false security they perhaps foster among
community members, 4 registration and notification laws are in
place virtually nationwide, including at the federal level, and are
enormously popular with the public. Viewed in context, the
" See Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 938 F. Supp. 1080, 1092 (D. Conn. 1996)
("[C]ommunity notification is intended.., to protect the public from devastating crimes. This
goal is certainly one within the traditionally broad police powers of the State.") (footnote omit-
ted).
Several states, including California, Florida, Georgia, and Montana, have also resorted to al-
ternate means of non-incarcerative control of sex offenders-chemical castration. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 645 (West 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.0235 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-
44-2 (1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-512 (1997). See generally Robert D. Miller, Forced Admini-
stration of Sex-Drive Reducing Medications to Sex Offenders: Treatment or Punishment?, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 175 (1998). For incisive treatments of the larger social forces contributing to the
modern proliferation of legislative measures designed to protect society from sexual harm, see
Deborah W. Denno, Life Before the Modern Sex Offender Statutes, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 1317 (1998);
John Pratt, The Rise and Fall of Homophobia and Sexual Psychopath Legislation in Postwar Society, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y& L. 25 (1998).
" In addition to having purported benefits in terms of increasing community awareness and
vigilance, the laws are thought justified by both specific and general deterrence. See Doe v.
Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 389 (N.J. 1995) (reasoning that registration and notification "[l]aws not
only protect against crime but deter it: both for the potential offender.., as well as for those
who might otherwise commit a first sex offense but for the potential impact...").
" See, e.g.,James R. Acker & Catherine Cerulli, When Answers Precede Questions: Megan's Laws'
Uncertain Policy Consequences, 34 CRIM. L. BULL 235, 246-49 (1998) (surveying potential pitfalls,
including: that offenders are made more likely to commit crimes due to the ostracism associated
with notification; that offenders will "go underground" to avoid notification; and that prospects
for rehabilitation are significantly diminished due to the highly stigmatizing effects of notifica-
tion).
" See Brian J. Telpner, Note, Const ucting Safe Communities: Megan's Laws and the Purposes of
Punishment 85 GEO. L.J. 2039, 2063 (1997) (describing how registration and notification can
lead to overconfidence); see also Mike Allen, Girl's Slaying Exposes Limits of Connecticut "Megan's
Law", N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1998, at BI (noting inadequacy of local registry in preventing murder
of child victim).
In fact, the basic assumption that sex offenses are typically committed by strangers, an as-
sumption which appears to drive notification laws, itself lacks empirical support, raising further
concern over the creation ofa falsesense of security. SeeBruceJ. Winick, Sex OffenderLaws in the
1990s: A TherapeuticJurisprudenceAnalysis, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL & L. 505, 554-55 (1998) (citing
studies indicating that most sex offenses are perpetrated by family members and those already
known to the victim).
" See generally Wayne A. Logan, A Study in "ActuarialJustice": Sex Offender Classification Practice
and Procedure, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. (forthcoming 2000) (surveying proliferation of laws).
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laws represent a conspicuous example of what Professor Carol
Steiker has referred to as the emerging "preventive state,"
whereby government acts not as a "punisher... but rather as
preventer of crime and disorder more generally," and seeks to
"identify and neutralize dangerous individuals before they
commit crimes by restricting their liberty in a variety of ways.
16
Since their implementation in the early 1990s, sex offender
registration and notification laws have been the subject of re-
peated constitutional challenges, almost all unsuccessful. At-
tacks based on the Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Double
Jeopardy, and Ex Post Facto Clauses have usually met with de-
feat, on the reasoning that such laws do not impose "punish-
ment" for constitutional purposes.17 Less common challenges,
sounding in equal protection, 18 the right to unrestricted travel,19
and the Fourth Amendment20 have been rejected as well. With
these claims exhausted, sex offenders have now turned to an-
other constitutional avenue: procedural due process. Despite
the fact that registration and notification can have deleterious,
Indeed, President Clinton has announced the federal initiation of a nationwide registry, de-
signed in his words to "keep track of [sex offenders]-not just in a single state, but wherever
they go, wherever they move, so that parents and police have the warning they need to protect
our children. Deadly criminals don't stay within state lines, so neither should law enforcement's
tools to stop them." See Mary McCrory, Clinton Sets Tracking of Sex Offenders, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
25, 1996, at Al. This nationalization, in lieu of the non-uniform state use of registration, is di-
rected at the concern that sex offenders will gravitate tojurisdictions without such requirements.
See Sheila Grissert, Law Keeps Sex Offenders in Public Eye, TIMES-PICAYUNE (NEW ORLEANS), Oct. 24,
1993, at BI (quoting Louisiana parole administrator to the effect that the State's community no-
tification law has discouraged paroled sex offenders from locating in Louisiana).
" Carol S. Steiker, Supreme Court Review Foreword: The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. GRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 771,774 (1998).
" For examples of unsuccessful eighth amendment claims, see Roe v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp.
174, 193 (D. Mass. 1998); Doe v. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (W.D. Mich. 1997); State v.
Scott, 961 P.2d 667, 676 (Kan. 1998); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367,405 (N.J. 1995).
For examples of unsuccessful ex post facto and double jeopardy claims, see Russell v. Gre-
goire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1093 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1191 (1998); Doe v. Pataki, 120
F.3d 1263, 1285 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denkAd, 118 S. Ct 1066 (1998); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d
1077, 1105 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct 1039 (1998); Spencer v. O'Connor, 707 N.E.2d
1039, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Poritz, 662 A.2d at 404-05; Snyder v. State, 912 P.2d 1127, 1132
(Wyo. 1996). But see State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1043 (Kan. 1996) (notification violates ex
post facto); State v. Calhoun, 669 So. 2d 1359, 1363 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (registration alone vio-
lates ex post facto).
" See, e.g., Artway v. Attorney Gen., 81 F.3d 1235, 1267-68 (3d Cir. 1996); Farwel 999 F. Supp.
at 195; State v. Zichko, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (Idaho 1996); Poritz, 662 A.2d at 413; State v. Ward,
869 P.2d 1062, 1076-77 (Wash. 1994); Snyder 912 P.2d at 1132.
" See, e.g., State v. Cameron, 916 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Ariz. Ct App. 1996).
" See, e.g., Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1558 (9th Cir. 1995); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp.
1372, 1381 (D. Alaska 1994).
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life-long effects, not all jurisdictions afford due process protec-
tions to the broad variety of offenders targeted. Moreover, state
and federal courts have reached differing results on the ques-
don of whether those subject to notification possess a "liberty
interest" sufficient to compel due process protections, i.e., no-
tice and an opportunity to be heard.
21
This article examines the critical threshold question of
whether sex offender registrants enjoy a protectible liberty in-
terest relative to community notification,22 which threatens the
disclosure of highly personal data, including offenders' criminal
history and address information, and the State's attendant
branding of offenders as citizens worthy of fear and disdain.
After describing the various state and federal procedures in
place to effectuate community notification, the article examines
the Supreme Court's decisions in the areas of privacy and gov-
ernmental stigmatization. In Part IV, the decisions of the sev-
eral state and federal courts that have thus far addressed the
liberty interest issue are discussed, followed by an analysis of the
significant due process and fairness issues raised. Finally, in
Part V, the article considers how the Supreme Court is likely to
address the question of whether notification implicates a cogni-
21As the Supreme Court has stated: "[w]e examine procedural due process questions in two
steps: the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered
with by the State; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation
were constitutionally sufficient." Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460
(1989). See also United States v.James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43,53 (1993) ("The
right to prior notice and a hearing is central to the Constitution's command of due process.").
n In line with the vast majority of state and federal courts concluding that no liberty interest
is implicated relative to registration alone, the discussion here is limited principally to the pro-
cedural due process concerns associated with notification. See e.g., Artway, 81 F.3d at 1268 (find-
ing no liberty interest with respect to registration alone); Cutshall v. Sundquist, 980 F. Supp.
928, 931 (M.D. Tenn. 1997) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999); In re
C.M., 578 N.W.2d 391, 396 n.4 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (same); Commonwealth v. Mountain, 711
A-2d 473, 478 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (same). Cf. Doe v. Attorney Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1014
(Mass. 1997) ("It may or may not be that the requirement that the plaintiff appear at a local po-
lice station, register as a sex offender, and answer certain questions impermissibly violates his
liberty and privacy interests.").
" Importantly, the focus here is only on the threshold question of whether a liberty interest
is implicated, not the precise contours or extent of due process that should be afforded once
such an interest is identified. This latter inquiry, itself easily the subject of an article of equal
length, is addressed pursuant to the Supreme Court's test enunciated in Mattheas v. Eldridge,
which balances: (1) the significance of the jeopardized interest; (2) the risk of erroneous depri-
vation of that interest as a result of the extant procedures and the probable value of additional
safeguards; and (3) the governments interest, including the administrative burden associated
with additional procedural safeguards. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
1999] 1171
1172 WAYNE A. LOGAN [Vol. 89
zable liberty interest, in light of the Court's relevant precedent
and increasing predisposition to regard "liberty" in narrow
terms, especially with respect to the liberties retained by those
convicted of crimes.
II. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION PROVISIONS
NATIONWIDE
As is now well-known, the New Jersey Legislature in 1994
enacted "Megan's Law," officially referred to as the Sex Of-
fender Registration Act, in response to the brutal sexual assault
and murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka.2 Although New
Jersey was not the first American jurisdiction to register sex of-
fenders,- Megan's Law served as a dramatic catalyst for the reg-
istration movement. Today, all fifty states, the District of
Columbia, and the federal government impose some form of
registration requirement on sex offenders, however defined.
This proliferation of registration laws, in no small part, has also
stemmed from the unsubtle influence of the federal govern-
ment which, in 1994, required states to register and gather in-
"See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C-7 (West 1995).
California apparently was the first state to implement a sex offender registry, doing so in
1947. See Elizabeth A. Pearson, Status and Latest Developments in Sex Offender Registration and Notifi-
cation Laws, in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES 45 (U.S. Bureau ofJustice
Statistics ed., 1998).
" Id. In 1996, Massachusetts became the last state to enact a registration law. See Doris Sue
Wong, Weld Signs Bill Creating Sex-Offender Registry-Those Convicted Have to Register, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 15, 1996, at B2.
Criminal registration laws more generally trace their U.S. origins back to at least the 1930s.
See Note, Criminal Registration Ordinances: Police Control Over Potential Recidivists, 103 U. PA. L. REV.
60, 61-64 (1954). In Lambert v. California, the Supreme Court invalidated a Los Angeles ordi-
nance that made it unlawful for "any convicted person" to fail to register with local authorities,
reasoning that the provision violated due process in the absence of "actual knowledge of the
duty to register or proof of the probability of such knowledge ... ." 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957).
Lambert, although apt, is likely of little consequence relative to the contemporary wave of sex of-
fender registration laws. For instance, citing Lambert, the Ninth Circuit recently rejected the
claim of a habeas petitioner who challenged his conviction for failing to register as a sex of-
fender as required by California law. See McDonald v. Marin County Sheriff, No. 98-16144, 1999
WL 390991 (9th Cir. May 25, 1999). Although petitioner was not notified of the registration re-
quirements at the time of sentencing, he "received actual notice of the registration require-
ments before he was released from prison and was therefore able to 'avoid the consequences of
the law.'" Id. at *1 (citing Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229). The McDonald court also rejected peti-
tioner's claim, based on Robinson v. California, that the law in effect sought to "criminalize" his
"status" as a sex offender; on the contrary, the court held, the law "properly criminalizes the act
of failing to register." Id. at *2 (discussing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)).
"SeeAndy Newman, Megan, Her Law and What It Spawned, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1996, at 1.
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formation on sex offenders under threat of losing a portion of
federal funds if they did not comply."
Even more recently, jurisdictions in overwhelming numbers
have enacted laws that allow public dissemination of registrant
information, once again under federal threat. Although the
1994 federal legislation stated that jurisdictions "may release"
collected registrant information,2 Congress in 1996 directed
that state law enforcement "shall release relevant information that
is necessary to protect the public" concerning registrants.30 Of-
ficially called the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program,"1 the federal law rep-
resents "a floor for state programs, not a ceiling,"02 relative to
both the information that must be gathered 3 and the types of
offenders subject to registration.3
See42 U.S.C. § 14071(d) (1994).
See id. (stating that information "shall be treated as private data except that" it "may" be
disclosed to law enforcement and government agencies for background checks, and that police
"may release relevant information that is necessary to protect the public. . ."). Washington
State, in 1990, became the first jurisdiction to enact a sex offender "notification provision." See
Pearson, supra note 25, at 45.
" See Megan's Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, § 2(d), 110, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e) (2)
(1995 & Supp. 1999). As the federal guidelines unequivocally state:
[A] State cannot comply with the Act by releasing registration information only to law en-
forcement agencies, to other governmental or non-governmental agencies or organiza-
tions, to prospective employers, or to the victims of registrants' offenses. States also cannot
comply by having purely permissive or discretionary authority for officials to release regis-
tration information. Information must be released to members of the public as necessary
to protect the public from registered offenders.
See Megan's Law; Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexu-
ally Violent Offender Registration Act, as Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 572, 581 (1999) [hereinafter
Final Guidelines].
3 See42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1998) (emphasis added).
"See Final Guidelines, supra note 30, at 572.
Federal law, for instance, requires that registration information, at a minimum, include an
offender's name, fingerprints, photo, and present address (which must remain updated). See42
U.S.C. § 14071(b) (1). The Guidelines suggest that States might also wish to obtain (1) informa-
tion about a registrant's "expected employment" upon release from confinement and (2) "DNA
samples... to be typed and stored in state DNA databases." See Final Guidelines, supra note 30,
at 579.
"Federal law requires, at a minimum, that states register persons "convicted of a criminal of-
fense against a victim who is a minor" and those "convicted of a sexually violent offense." See 42
U.S.C. § 14071(a) (1) (A). The former category includes kidnapping and false imprisonment of
a minor (by other than a parent), as well as an extensive array of sex-related offenses (including
attempts). See id. § 14071 (a) (3) (A) (i)-(viii). The latter includes forms of aggravated and non-
aggravated sexual abuse, as defined by federal law. See id § 14071(a) (3) (B). See also Final
Guidelines, supra note 30, at 577 (including "rape or rape-like offenses-i.e., non-consensual
sexually assaultive crimes involving penetration-regardless of the age of the victim").
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Therefore, the federal government has mandated that reg-
istrants' information be released,M but has largely left to the
states, consistent with "public safety purposes," the questions of
(1) which offenders should be the target of disclosure; (2) the
information gathered and the extent of disclosure; and (3) the
standards and procedures, if any, appropriate to these determi-
nations. M
At present, jurisdictions use any (or some combination) of three methods of dissemina-
tion: (1) "public access," which requires community members to request information from a
given jurisdiction's registry (which can exist in written or CD-ROM form, and at times can also
be accessed by telephone "hot-line"); (2) Internet web-site access; and (3) affirmative commu-
nity notification by law enforcement, which can involve the use of informational fliers and door-
to-door visits by police. See DEVON B. ADAMS, U.S. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, SUMMARY OF
STATE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY DISSEMINATION PROCEDURES: UPDATE 1999 (1999) (describing
variety of methods). In one jurisdiction, Louisiana, registrants themselves are required to effec-
tuate notification. Among other statutory requirements, each registrant must:
[g]ive notice of the crime for which he was convicted, his name, and address to: (a) at least
one person in every residence or business within a one mile radius in a rural area and a
three square block area in an urban or suburban area of the address where the defendant
will reside upon release ....
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 542(B) (1) (a) (West 1999). The sentencing court, in its discretion, can
also require notification by means of "signs, handbills, bumper stickers, or clothing labeled to
that effect." Id. § 542(B) (3).
Among the various strategies, the Internet possesses the greatest potential for widespread
dissemination-even beyond state or local boundaries. Indeed, in California, where authorities
primarily use a CD-ROM to effectuate notification, individuals have transcribed registrant in-
formation and instituted their own web sites containing registrant data. See Kathleen Ingley, Sex
Offender Info Goes Online: Posting Seen as Powerful Tool, Menace ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 4, 1999, at Al,
available in LEXIS, News Group File. Also, in California, it appears that local law enforcement
are permitted to enlist the help of the news media in disseminating registrant information, on
the statutory premise that police are to "advise the public." See Byron M. v. City of Whittier, 46 F.
Supp. 2d 1037, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
"Final Guidelines, supra note 30, at 582. Federal law does specify heightened requirements
for offenders deemed "sexually violent predators." See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a) (1) (B), (a) (2). A
'sexual predator" is "a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who suf-
fers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in
predatory sexually violent offenses." Id. § 14071(a) (3) (C). Unlike all other potential regis-
trants, federal law makes such offenders alone subject to ajudicial determination of their eligi-
bility for registration and notification. See id. § 14071(a) (2) (A). The determination is to be
'made by a court after considering the recommendation of a board composed of experts in the
behavior and treatment of sex offenders, victims' rights advocates, and representatives of law en-
forcement agencies." Id. If the offender is categorized a "sexually violent predator," the state
must also obtain "identifying factors, anticipated future residence, offense history, and docu-
mentation of any treatment received for the mental abnormality or personality disorder of the
person." Id § 14071 (b) (1) (B). "Predators" must also provide quarterly address verification (as
opposed to the annual verification required of registrants more generally). Id. §
1407.1(b) (3)(B). Finally, "predators" are subject to mandatory lifetime registration. Id §
14071 (b) (6) (B) (iii). The Department ofJustice, however, can waive the judicial determination
requirement if a jurisdiction employs "alternative measures of comparable or greater effective-
ness." Id § 14071 (a) (2).
Importantly, however, the Guidelines leave it to the states to formulate how and when such a
determination will be sought as to a particular offender. See Final Guidelines, supra note 30, at
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Pursuant to the latitude afforded by Congress, the states
now use a variety of methods to determine which offenders war-
rant registration and notification. One approach, which, in the
words of the Federal Guidelines is "consistent with the require-
ments of the Act,07 entails "particularized risk assessments ...
with differing degrees of information release[d] based on the
degree of risk."' ' A handful of jurisdictions, including Massa-
chusetts, New Jersey, and New York, use such an approach.3 9
Under these regimes, the recidivism risk levels of offenders are
assessed on the basis of specified criteria during a hearing be-
fore a court or a specially constituted board, with due process
rights afforded to the offender. The evaluative outcome deter-
mines the extent, method, and duration of public notification
experienced by offenders. For instance, only law enforcement
might be notified of the presence of "low risk" offenders, while
community entities at particular risk (e.g., schools or child care
facilities) are notified of "medium risk" offenders, and the
community as a whole is warned of "high risk" offenders.
On the other hand, nineteen states employ a compulsory
approach, which requires that offenders satisfying statutory, of-
fense-related criteria be subject to registration and notification,
affording offenders no right to a prior hearing on the eligibility
determination.1 Seven others leave it to the exclusive discretion
583 (stating that such a triggering event can result from the "judgment of prosecutors, or might
provide that a determination of this question should be undertaken routinely when a person is
convicted of a sexually violent offense..."). Moreover, the determination can be made either at
time of sentence imposition or just prior to release from custody. Id.
" Final Guidelines, supra note 30, at 582.
'Id.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, §§ 178D, 178K (West 1999); NJ. SrAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1
(West 1997); N.Y. CoRREGr. LAw § 168 (McKinney 1999).
See e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 178K (West 1999) (describing three-level notifica-
tion system). In New York, all sex offenders convicted of specified offenses experience disclo-
sure of their status as a convicted sex offender, the nature of their crime, and their specific risk
level classification by means of a "900" number usable by any community member. See Doe v.
Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Level Two offenders experience identical expo-
sure, but "any entity with vulnerable populations" can receive the registrant's "background in-
formation," a photograph, and approximate home address. Id. (citation omitted). Level Three
offenders are subject to community-wide dissemination of their exact address, in addition to the
aforementioned other information. Id. Furthermore, with respect to Level Two and Three reg-
istrants, entities "with vulnerable populations" can disseminate information received "at their
discretion." Id.
' See ALA. CODE § 15-20-21 (1999); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.65.087, 12.63.010 (Michie 1999);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-250 to -261 (West Supp. 1999);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4121 (1999); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2 to -/12, 152/105 to -
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of local law enforcement,42 despite their presumptive lack of
clinical experse,8 to determine on an ex parte basis which statu-.
torily eligible offenders pose the greatest community risk, and
therefore warrant being subject to notification. Finally, in many
states, due process is afforded only to a select group of statuto-
rily specified offenders (e.g., "sexually violent predators").44
The upshot of the present situation is that, although regis-
trants face the acute public opprobrium, and manifold other
negative consequences of notification,45 for periods of time
/130(West 1993 & Supp. 1999); IND. CODEANN. § 5-2-12-4 (West Supp. 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-4902 to -4909 (1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.722 to .730(West 1999); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 45-33-1 to -19 (Supp. 1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 589.400 to .425 (West Supp. 1999); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-B:1 to -B:9 (Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-11A-2 to -7 (Michie 1997
& Supp. 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 57, §§ 581-589 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 23-3-400 to -520 (Law Co-op. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-31 to -41 (Michie 1999);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-101 to -110 (1997 & Supp. 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5
(1999); VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-298.1 to -298.4 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1999).
4' See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3825 (West Supp. 1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 846E-1 to -9
(Michie 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN tit. 34A §§ 11121 to -11144 (West Supp. 1999); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 29-4005, 294013 (Michie Supp. 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (1999);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550(3) (West Supp. 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.45 to -.46
(1999).
4' Recidivism risk assessments, even when made by experts, are notoriously inaccurate in
finding false-positives. See, e.g., Eric S.Janus, The Use of Social Science and Medicine in Sex Offender
Commitment, 23 NEW ENG.J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 347, 372 n.1 1 (1997) (citing studies);
Jenny A. Montana, An Ineffective Weapon in the Fight Against Child Sexual Abuse: NewJersey's Megan's
Law, 3 J.L. & PoLY' 569, 590 (1995) (noting that predictions of dangerousness result in false-
positives two-thirds of the time). See generaly RobertJ. McGrath, Sex-Offender Risk Assessment and
Disposition Planning: A Review of Empirical and Clinical Findings, 35 INT'LJ. OFFENDER THERAPY &
CoMp. CRIMINOLOGY 328, 331-43 (1991) (providing exhaustive review of studies revealing the
difficulty of assessing future dangerousness).
Even more fundamentally, there is widespread disagreement over whether, in fact, sex of-
fenders as a criminal sub-population manifest higher recidivism rates than other criminal actors.
See, e.g., David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Cimes"Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L.
REV. 529, 572-73 (1994) ("[N]o study has demonstrated that sex offenders have a consistently
higher or lower recidivism rate than other major offenders .... ."); R. Karl Hanson & Monique
T. Bussi6re, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of Sexual Offender Recidivism Studies, 66 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL 348, 357 (1998) (concluding, based on meta-analysis of 61
follow-up studies, that only 13% of offenders committed new sex offenses within a 4-5 year moni-
toring period); Kirk Heilbrun, et al., Sexual Offending: Linking Assessment, Intervention, and Ded-
sion-Makin; 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y& L. 138, 139 (1998) (noting that there is "little consensus in
the literature").
"Sem e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21 (West Supp. 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (Harrison
1998 & Supp. 1999); IDAHO CODE § 18-8312 to -8321 (Supp. 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 541
to 542.1 (West 1999); MD. CODE ANN., CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, § 792(a) (Supp. 1999); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-208.20 (Supp. 1998). North Carolina, for instance, has a two-track system: the
"Sex Offender and Public Protection Program" and the "Sexually Violent Predator Registration
Program."
Reports of suicides and acts of vigilantism as a consequence of community notification
have become common in the news. See, e.g., Robert Hanley, Shots Fired at the Hose of a Rapist,
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1998, at B1 (vigilantism); Todd S. Purdum, Death of Sex Offender is Tied to
Megan's Law, N.Y. TIMES,July 9,1998, atA16 (suicide); Convicted Rapist Is ShotAt, N.Y. TIMES,July
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ranging from ten years to life,46 most states fail to afford offend-
ers due process protections before notification decisions are
made.47
Recently, several courts have stepped into this vacuum and
required states to afford basic due process rights before individ-
ual sex offenders are subjected to notification. For instance, in
Massachusetts the Supreme Judicial Court, in the absence of a
legislative requirement, has held that due process compels that
a hearing be conducted even before "level-one" sex offenders
(those posing the least risk) are subject to registration and noti-
fication.48 In Oregon, the State Supreme Court required the
State to provide registrants notice and an opportunity to be
heard prior to carrying out notification. 49 And the Middle Dis-
trict of Alabama recently enjoined application of the Alabama
Community Notification Act,0 which entails arguably the na-
1, 1998, at B1 (vigilantism); Suicide is Recalled as Maine Revisits Megan's Law, WASH. PoSr, Feb. 17,
1998, atA2 (suicide).
With public disclosure there also often come a litany of related practical difficulties, such as
finding work and a place to live. See; e.g., John T. McQuiston, Sex Offender Is Suing His Neighbors
Over Protests, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1997, at B1 (describing rallies staged to protest registrant's
presence, the throwing of a brick through his car window, and harassing calls to his employer);
Lisa Sink, Long After Release Date Man Still Lives in Prison, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, June 1, 1999,
at 1, available in LEXIS, News Group File (describing inability of registrant to find residence 15
months after date of mandatory release); Convicted Child Molester LosesJob, LA. DAILY NEws, Jan.
16, 1997, at N10 (describing how registrant was forced from his job); Parents Protest to Oust Moles-
ter from Community: Neighbors Collect Signatures on Petitions, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 8, 1997, at B3
(recounting neighborhood's efforts to drive out registrant). Cf Henry Gottlieb, Fighting a Local
Ban on Sex Criminals, NAT'L LJ., May 17, 1999, at A7 (discussing lawsuit filed by homeowner
against homeowners' association bylaw that bars residency to registrants).
4' See Alan R. Kabat, Comment, Scarlet Letter Sex Offender Databases and Community Notification:
Sacificing Person Privacy for a Symbol's Sake; 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 333, 359-61 (1998) (providing
state-by-state listing reflecting range from 10 years to lifetime registration). Furthermore, in
every jurisdiction, criminal prosecution (at times felony) can ensue if registration information is
not maintained and verified at intervals prescribed by law. See infra note 197 and accompanying
text.
4Some twenty-nine states do permit registrants to petition for a rehearing of a notification
determination, but after notification has occurred, on the basis of successful rehabilitation or
lack of perceived dangerousness. See Kabat, supra note 46, at 343.
' See Doe v. Attorney Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007,1013 (Mass. 1997). According to the court:
[I]t is contrary to the principle of fundamental fairness that underlies the concept of due
process of law to deny the plaintiff a hearing at which the evidence might show that he is
not a threat to children and other vulnerable persons whom the act seeks to protect and
that disclosure is not needed .... The plaintiff is entitled to a hearing and a determination
as to whether he must register under the act and, if so, whether sex offender information
concerning him should be available on request.
Id. at 1014.
' See Noble v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 964 P.2d 990,997 (Or. 1998).
* Doe v. Pryor, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
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tion's most aggressive notification regime,5 because the Act
failed to afford a particular offender notice and a hearing prior
to notification.52
The prevalent lack of due process protections in the notifi-
cation determination looms as a major constitutional issue, one
that is only now reaching the courts because of the recency of
notification laws. State and federal courts, however, are divided
on the due process question, reaching divergent results on the
question of whether registrants possess a "liberty interest" suffi-
cient to require due process. This lack of constitutional con-
cern doubtless stems in large part from the unappealing status
of the litigants pressing such claims. But it is also explained by
the complex and uncertain body of federal constitutional law
on the central questions of whether citizens possess a liberty in-
terest as against governmental stigmatization and the disclosure
of personal information. These questions are taken up next.
III. PRIVACY, REPUTATION, AND THE BOUNDS OF PROTETBLE
LIBERTY INTERESTS
It is a cardinal constitutional principle, embedded in no less
than two amendments to the U.S. Constitution,53 that if the gov-
ernment desires to deprive any citizen of "life, liberty or prop-
erty," at a minimum, notice and an opportunity to be heard
must first be afforded.54 Despite the clarity of the command, the
Supreme Court has charted a zig-zag course with respect to the
precise interests deemed deserving of due process protection.
" ALA. CODE § 15-20-20 to -24 (1999). Notification occurs by means of a "flyer" that con-
tains, inter alia, offense information, a photo, and the name and home address of the registrant.
See id § 15-20-21 (a) (2). Law enforcement is required to distribute the flyer by hand or regular
mail, or by means of posting the flyer, placing it in a local newspaper, or making it available on
the Internet or "other means available." Id. § 15-20-22(a). The geographic breadth of the notifi-
cation varies by location. In Alabama's larger cities, notice is spread to all residences within
1,000 feet of the offender's residence and to all schools and childcare facilities within three
miles. Id. § 15-20-22 (a) (2). In other areas, notice goes to all residences within 2,000 feet of the
offender's residence and to all schools and childcare facilities within six miles. Id. § 15-20-
22 (a) (3).
Pyor, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person ... be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law.. . ."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[Nior shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law....").
"See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527 (1981); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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As Professor Laurence Tribe observes in his treatise, identifica-
tion of protected "liberty" interests, in particular:
has been an evolving process punctuated by vague generalizations
and declarations of broad overarching principles. Due process has
been held to protect "those fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions,"
and to guarantee those procedures which are required for the "pro-
tection of ultimate decency in a civilized society."5
Notification laws, which disseminate highly personal and
stigmatizing information to entire communities on the basis of
perceived risk of sex offender recidivism, raise obvious concern
over whether the "liberty" of sex offenders is jeopardized. As
discussed next, however, the Supreme Court's relevant prece-
dent fails to provide a clear-cut answer to the question of
whether a cognizable liberty interest protects against disclosure
of such information without prior notice and an opportunity to
be heard on whether notification is appropriate and, if so, its
extent.
A. NONDISCLOSURE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
It is well established that the Constitution ensures a general
right to informational privacy, which the Court has character-
ized as the "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of per-
sonal matters. 56 However, while such a right indisputably exists,
its contours have yet to be clearly delineated by the Court.
In Whalen v. Roe, for instance, the Court considered whether
a New York law, requiring that personal physicians inform a
State agency of the names of patients receiving certain drugs,
violated the patients' rights to privacy.7 The Court concluded
that the patients had a privacy right as to the medical informa-
tion, but stated that no deprivation of liberty was threatened be-
cause the law contained strict security measures designed to
LAURENcE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-8, at 678 (2d ed. 1988) (cita-
tions omitted) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884) and Adamson v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (FrankfurterJ., concurring)).
SeeWhalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.23, 599-600 (1977). Additionally, individuals enjoy
a privacy right against unwarranted governmental intrusion upon their capacity to make impor-
tant decisions of an intimate or personal nature. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
See generally Shields v. Burge, 874 F.2d 1201, 1209 (7th Cir. 1989) (referring to respective inter-
ests as the "confidentiality" and "autonomy" strands of the right of privacy).
SWha/en, 429 U.S. at 591-93.
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protect against unwarranted disclosure.8 Because the New York
law involved only the accumulation, not disclosure, of sensitive
personal information, the Whalen Court expressly reserved opin-
ion on whether any constitutional concerns would be presented
in relation to the "unwarranted disclosure of accumulated pri-
vate data-whether intentional or unintentional ... .59
In two subsequent decisions the Court did address the issue
of public disclosure. In 1989, the Court decided United States
Department ofJustice v. Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press,6°
involving a request made pursuant to the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA) by journalists for the "rap-sheet" of a specified
individual.1 The government refused to release the informa-
tion in the name of the individual's right to privacy. 2 The
Court agreed, concluding that FOIA created an expectation of
privacy as to the assembled criminal history information con-
tained in the "rap-sheet," despite the otherwise "public" nature
of the information. According to the Court:
Although much rap-sheet information is a matter of public rec-
ord, the availability and dissemination of the actual rap sheet to the
public is limited. Arrests, indictments, convictions, and sentences
are public events that are usually documented in public records ....
[However], [the majority of] States place substantial restrictions on
the availability of criminal history summaries even though individual
events in those summaries are matters of public record.
Although it found a privacy right to exist relative to the disclo-
sure of such sensitive information, the Court was at pains to ac-
knowledge the statutory nature of the claim before it, stating
"[I he question of the statutory meaning of privacy under the
FOIA is, of course, not the same as the question . . . [of]
whether an individual's interest in privacy is protected by the
Constitution. " 6
Id. at 599.
Id. at 605-06. Justice Brennan, concurring, stated that such disclosure would violate the
right to privacy, while justice Stewart opined to the contrary. See id. at 606 (Brennan,J., concur-
ring); id. (StewartJ, concurring).
60489 U.S. 749 (1989).
A "rap-sheet" typically contains the date of birth, physical description, and history of ar-
rests, charges, convictions, and sentences of offenders. Id. at 752.
Id. at 757-58.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 762 n.13.
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Five years later, in United States Department of Defense v. Federal
Labor Relations Authority,65 the Court addressed whether the dis-
closure of the home addresses of non-unionized federal em-
ployees, at the request of two labor unions, violated the
employees' privacy rights arising under both the federal Privacy
Act of 1974 and FOIA.6 Characterizing the public interest in
disclosure as "negligible," weighed against the "not insubstan-
tial" interest of the employees to keep their addresses private,
the Court prohibited the compelled disclosure.67 The Court
deemed insignificant the fact that the addresses themselves were
otherwise publicly available by means of such sources as tele-
phone directories and voter registration lists, stating: " [a]n indi-
vidual's interest in controlling the dissemination of information
regarding personal matters does not dissolve simply because
that information may be available to the public in some form.
" 68
This privacy interest is especially implicated, Justice Thomas
reasoned for the majority, because disclosure of the employee
addresses threatened unwarranted intrusions into the home (on
the basis of unsolicited mailings, phone calls or visits),69 a do-
main "accorded special consideration in our Constitution, laws,
and traditions. 70
Taken together, the Court's decisions in the area of infor-
mational privacy establish that such a right exists and that the
privacy expectation as to personal information is not wholly dis-
solved merely because the information is otherwise publicly
available. As the Reporters' Committee Court stated in preventing
compelled disclosure of an individual's rap-sheet, "[p]lainly
510 U.S. 490 (1994).
Id. at 493-94 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2) (1988 ed. & Supp. IV)).
"The Court expressly reserved opinion on the specific extent and nature of the employees'
privacy interest in keeping their addresses confidential: "Because a very slight privacy interest
would suffice to outweigh the relevant public interest, we need not be exact in our quantifica-
tion of the privacy interest. It is enough for present purposes to observe that the employees' in-
terest in nondisclosure is not insubstantial." Id. at 500.
6#Id.
,Id. at 501.
Id- The Court added:
Moreover, when we consider that other parties, such as commercial advertisers and solici-
tors, must have the same access under FOIA as the unions to the employee address lists
sought in this case, it is clear that the individual privacy interest that would be protected by
nondisclosure is far from insignificant.
Id.
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there is a vast difference between the public records that might
be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county ar-
chives, and local police stations throughout the country and a
computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of in-
formation."7' Similarly, although the home addresses of indi-
viduals are otherwise publicly available to those who
affirmatively seek them out, the Court in Federal Labor Relations
Authority made clear that because the home enjoys special con-
stitutional privacy protection, public disclosure of addresses
warrants special concern. 2 At the same time, however, the
Court's decisions seemingly leave unanswered whether a consti-
tutional-as opposed to a statutor--right of privacy exists rela-
tive to the disclosure by the government of sensitive personal
information."
B. PERSONAL REPUTATION
Closely related to the issue of whether individuals have a
protectible constitutional interest relative to the government's
publication of embarrassing or sensitive facts, even if otherwise
publicly available, is the question of whether there exists a lib-
erty interest in avoiding governmental stigmatization or be-
smirchment of personal reputation. Once again, as with the
right to informational privacy, while the Court has been clear
that individuals possess some interest against unwarranted gov-
71 United States Dep't ofJustice v. Reporters' Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 US. 749,
763 (1989).
n Federal Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. at 501.
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, the Court again touched upon the issue of public disclo-
sure of otherwise private information. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). There, the Court invalidated a state
statute that prohibited the disclosure of the names of rape victims, which was "truthful informa-
tion contained in official court records open to public inspection." Id at 494-95. However, in so
doing the Court emphasized the important First Amendment interest in keeping government
activity (e.g., judicial proceedings) open to public scrutiny. Id. at 495. See also Florida Star v.
BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (holding that newspaper's publication of publicly released, law-
fully obtained police report that identified rape victim did not unconstitutionally invade pri-
vacy).
' Compare E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1103 n.23 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that the Court
has expressly reserved decision on the issue of any constitutional right in favor of nondisclosure)
with Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that "the Constitution does not
encompass a general right to nondisclosure of private information").
1182 [Vol. 89
1999] SEX OFFENDERS' LIBERTYINTERESTS 1183
ernmental actions that harm personal reputation," the constitu-
tional parameters of this interest remain elusive.
In 1971, the Court in Wisconsin v. Constantineau75 addressed
the constitutional validity of a Wisconsin statute that permitted
local officials, without notice or hearing, to post in liquor stores
the names of those who engage in "excessive drinking," and to
prohibit liquor sales to such persons.76 By a 6-3 vote, the Court
condemned the "posting" on due process grounds, unequivo-
cally holding that "where the State attaches 'a badge of infamy'
to the citizen, due process comes into play."77
Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at
stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an
opportunity to be heard are essential. "Posting" under the Wisconsin
Act may to some be merely the mark of illness, to others it is a stigma, an
official branding of the person. The label is a degrading one .... This
appellee was not afforded a chance to defend herself. She may have
been the victim of an official's caprice. Only when the whole proceed-
ings leading to the pinning of an unsavory label on a person are aired
can oppressive results be prevented.
7
8
Only five years later, in Paul v. Davis,79 the Court addressed
the constitutionality of police distribution of "flyers" to eight
'See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,341 (1974) ("[Tlhe individual's right to
the protection of his own good name 'reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential
dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered
liberty.'") (citation omitted); In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) ("[B]ecause of the cer-
tainty that [one found guilty of a crime] would be stigmatized by the conviction .... a society
that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for
commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt."); Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952) ("There can be no dispute about the consequences visited upon a
person excluded from public employment on disloyalty grounds. In the view of the community,
the stain is a deep one; indeed, it has become a badge of infamy.").
,400 U.S. 433 (1971).
,Id. at 434.
"Id. at 437 (citation omitted).
"Id Earlier in the opinion the majority stated: "It is significant that most of the provisions
of the Bill of Rights are procedural, for it is procedure that marks much of the difference be-
tween rule by law and rule by fiat." Id. at 436.
,424 U.S. 693 (1976).
In Board of Regents v. Roth, the Court addressed only in passing the relation between reputa-
tion and liberty. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). In Roth, an untenured university professor sued his em-
ployer when he was not rehired at the conclusion of his one-year appointment, alleging that
"the failure of University officials to give him notice of any reason of nonretention and an op-
portunity for a hearing violated his right to procedural due process of law." Id. at 569. The Roth
Court concluded that no liberty interest was implicated because the University made neither
"any charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in the com-
munity," nor "imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take
advantage of other employment opportunities." Id. at 573. The Court hastened to add, how-
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hundred local businesses containing the names and photo-
graphs of "active shoplifters." Plaintiff, who had been arrested
for shoplifting (but not convicted), sued under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging that his due process rights were violated when he
was so identified without first receiving notice and an opportu-
nity to "be heard.80 The Sixth Circuit upheld the claim, relying
on Constantineau.8'
In an opinion written by then-Justice Rehnquist, a five-
member 82 majority reversed, characterizing the claim as alleging
damage to "mere reputation," which in itself does not implicate
"liberty."83 According to the majority, the plaintiff in effect al-
leged only that "the State may not publicize a record of an offi-
cial act such as an arrest, 8 4 which in itself is not actionable:
"reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interest" is
not an interest deserving of constitutional protection." The ma-
jority concluded that, if the "posting" was actionable as defama-
tion, any remedy the plaintiff may have had lay with state tort
law.86 In so deciding, the majority distinguished Constantineau,
which it characterized as involving more than "mere defama-
tion"; according to the Paul majority, the "posting" in Constan-
tineau deprived the claimant of a "right previously held under
state law-the right to purchase or obtain liquor in common
with the rest of the citizenry."87
The majority also summarily rejected Paul's claim that cir-
culation of the flyer violated his right to privacy.8 Citing Roe v.
Wade,89 and Palko v. Connecticut,90 Justice Rehnquist stated that
the alleged substantive right before the Court fell outside the
ever, that had the University done either, a "different case" would have been presented. Id. at
573-74.
8o Pau4 424 U.S. at 695-96. In fact, after circulation of the flyer the shoplifting charge against
the plaintiffwas dismissed. Id. at 696.
" Id. at 697.
" Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. I. at 714.
Id. at 708-09.
T Id. at 713.
Id.at 701.
"Id. at 712.
'Id. at 708.
"Id. at 712-13.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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"fundamental" guarantees protected by the Constitution-"mat-
ters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family re-
lationships, and child rearing and education."9' The plaintiffs
claim was "far afield from this line of decisions":
He claims constitutional protection against the disclosure of the
fact of his arrest on a shoplifting charge. His claim is based, not upon
any challenge to the State's ability to restrict his freedom of action in a
sphere contended to be "private," but instead on a claim that the State
may not publicize a record of official act such as an arrest. None of our
substantive policy decisions hold this or anything like this, and we de-
cline to enlarge them in this manner.9
2
Paul has been widely condemned as an unjustified depar-
ture from what appeared to be the unequivocal recognition in
Constantineau of a "reputational" liberty interest against gov-
ernmental stigmatization." As Henry Paul Monaghan com-
mented some twenty years ago: "in a 'Constitution for a free
people,' it is an unsettling conception of 'liberty' that protects
an individual against state interference with his access to liquor
but not with his reputation in the community., 94 Nonetheless,
the Paul "stigma-plus" test 5 remains the law of the land.9 In-
Paul, 424 U.S. at 713.
"Id.
According to Richard Pierce, the Court's characterization of Constantineau as reflecting
anything less "was purely historical invention. Under Constantineau, any damage to an individ-
ual's reputation attributable to a government source constituted a deprivation of a protected
liberty interest." RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 1973, 1983-84 (1996) (footnote omitted). See also Barbara E. Armacost, Race and Reputa-
tion: The Real Legacy of Paul v. Davis, 85 VA. L. REv. 569, 576 (1999) (criticizing Paul generally
and calling decision an "astonishing reinterpretation of Constantineau.. ."); Sheldon Gelman,
"Life" and "Liberty":• Their Original Meaning, Historical Antecedents, and Current Significance in the De-
bate Over Abortion Rights, 78 MINN. L. REv. 585, 696 (1994) ("If the meaning of words in the
founding era matters, reputation deserves constitutional protection."); Henry P. Monaghan, Of
"Liberty" and "Property", 62 CoRNELL L. REv. 405, 424 (1977) ("The Court's re-rationalization of
the earlier cases is wholly startling to anyone familiar with those precedents. In many ways I find
this Pauls most disturbing aspect."); David L. Shapiro, Mr.fustce Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90
HARV. L. REV. 293, 328 (1976) (finding it "simply impossible to reconcile the explication of pro-
cedural due process contained in Paul v. Davis with prior decisions ...").
"See Monaghan, supra note 93, at 426 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572
(1972)).
The Paul Court's apparent repudiation of Constantineau is all the more striking when one
considers that the three dissenters in Constantineau themselves were concerned with abstention,
not the question of whether a liberty interest was at stake. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U.S. 433,439-43 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (joined by Blackmun,J.); id. at 443-45 (Black,
J., dissenting) (joined by Blackmun,J.).
"See, e.g., Vamonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 999-1000 (2d Cir. 1994) (referring to "stigma-plus"
test).
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deed, the Court's backpedaling from (although not outright re-
versal of) Constantineau was evidenced once again in 1991,
when, in Siegert v. Gilley,97 the Court held that injury to reputa-
tion alone by the government does not implicate a liberty inter-
est sufficient to trigger due process protections.98 In sum, as one
constitutional treatise has noted, "it appears that a person's in-
terest in his reputation may be totally unprotected by the due
process clause."9
As should be clear, the Court's decisions in the areas of in-
formational privacy and governmental stigmatization evince a
decided uncertainty. This lack of clarity notwithstanding, the
decisions are now providing the essential analytic framework
used by state and lower federal courts in their assessment of the
emerging due process challenges to community notification
laws.
IV. DUE PROCESS AND THE LIBERTY INTERESTS OF SEX OFFENDERS
With alternate constitutional avenues having proved un-
availing, °0 sex offenders are now challenging state notification
regimes on due process grounds-both substantive and proce-
dural. To date, substantive due process claims drawn from the
Supreme Court's uncertain informational privacy jurispru-
dence, discussed above, have been rejected by the courts. Even
when notification is found to jeopardize a substantive right to
privacy (usually because registrants' home addresses and places
Whatever the constitutional merit of the Court's "stigma-plus" test, it is clear that the facts
of Paulitself revealed something more than damage to "mere reputation." For instance, imme-
diately after the flyer was circulated, plaintiff's supervisor at work summoned him to hear "his
version of the events leading to his appearing in the flyer." Paul 424 U.S. at 696. Subsequently,
the supervisor warned that, although he would not then be fired, he "had best not find himself
in a similar situation" in the future. Id. Moreover, as a result of the flyer, plaintiff's supervisor
felt unable to assign him to any work involving a "mercantile establishment." Davis v. Paul, 505
F.2d 1180, 1184 (6th Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Finally, al-
though the shoplifting charges against the plaintiff were eventually dismissed, five years after the
flyer incident he reported that he was "broke, without employment, emotionally sick and in a
state of anxiety." See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 58, 100-01 n.85 (1976).
9500 U.S. 226 (1991).
9 I at 234.
-See RONALD D. ROTUNDA &JOHN E. NOWAY, TREATISE ON CONSTrUTIONAL LAW § 17.4, at
67 (3d ed. 1999).
1"' See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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of employment are disclosed),'°' the right is deemed subsidiary
to the overriding public interest thought served by making such
information available. 0 2 In other instances, no privacy right is
recognized as a threshold constitutional matter, on the reason-
ing that registrants have a lessened expectation of privacy as to
such "public" information, despite the fact that without notifica-
tion the information is otherwise not nearly so readily available
for community inspection and use. 3  As discussed later, regis-
trants have achieved greater, albeit not uniform, success by ar-
guing that failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be
heard prior to being subject to notification violates procedural
due process, resorting to the much-maligned "stigma-plus" test
enunciated in Paul v. Davis.'M
A. COURTS REFUSING TO FIND A LIBERTY INTEREST
To date, the most influential decision rejecting a due proc-
ess challenge is the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Russell v. Gre-
goire, °'5 which upheld the Washington State registration and
notification scheme. In Washington, all sex offenders'06 are re-
quired to provide the following information to the sheriff of
their county of residence: name; address; date and place of
birth; place of employment; crime of conviction and when and
"' See, e.g., Paul P. v. Veriero, 170 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 1999); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367,
408 (N.J. 1995).
" Se, e g., Paul P., 170 F.3d at 404 (characterizing state interest as "compelling"); Poritz, 662
A.2d at 412-13 (characterizing state interest as "legitimate and substantial"). Compare Paul P.,
170 F.3d at 406 (Fullam, J., concurring) (questioning whether the "theoretical and 'feel-good'
benefits of Megan's Law may in the long run, be overwhelmed by the law's negative conse-
quences. Statutes enabling, even perhaps encouraging, vigilantism and similar harms, seem ut-
terly at odds with constitutional values.").
'o See, e.g., Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[I]nformation collected
and disseminated . .. is already fully available to the public and is not constitutionally pro-
tected."); E.B. v. Veriero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1103 (3d Cir. 1997) (failing to find that publication of
"registrants' convictions and findings of dangerousness implicate any interest of fundamental
constitutional magnitude"); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1384 (D. Alaska 1994) (holding
that the right to privacy "does not attach to matters already within the public domain"); Paul P.
v. Verniero, 982 F. Supp. 961, 968 (D. N.J. 1997) (holding that notification "do[es] not uncon-
stitutionally implicate registrants' right to privacy"), affid, 170 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 1999).
""See infra notes 139-63 and accompanying text.
.. 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997).
'm Those subject to notification include offenders convicted of specified sex crimes, persons
found not guilty of an eligible offense by reason of insanity, persons found incompetent to stand
trial for an eligible offense and subsequently committed, persons committed as "sexual psycho-
paths," and persons committed as "sexually violent predators." Id. at 1082 (citing WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.24.550(3) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997)).
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where it occurred; aliases used; social security number; photo-
graph; and fingerprints.0 7 Prior to their release, an Offender
Oversight Committee assesses on an ex parte basis offender risk
levels based on information provided by the State Department
of Corrections, and determines which of three classification lev-
els (and hence scope and method of notification) is war-
ranted.' 8 Local law enforcement then independently reviews
the designation and releases "relevant and necessary informa-
tion" they deem "necessary for public protection. "'09
Willie Russell and Johnny Steams, both recently released
sex offenders, were classified by the Committee as "Level Three"
registrants, reserved for Washington's most feared offenders. As
a result, a "standard notification form" was to be provided to:
(1) government and law enforcement agencies; (2) schools
within the federal census tract of the registrants' residence; (3)
"Block Watch Captains" in the census tract and adjoining tracts;
and (4) the local news media.110 The notification form included
the registrants' picture, name, age, date of birth, as well as a
summary of crime(s) committed, and general information rela-
tive to their home address and place of employment."' The
standard notification form also contained a "caveat" that
threats, intimidation, or harassment of the registrant would "not
be tolerated.""
2
Subsequent to registering, Russell and Steams sued to en-
join notification, alleging inter alia that Washington's law vio-
lated their substantive rights to privacy and procedural due
process. The Western District of Washington denied their mo-
tions for injunctive relief, and notification was stayed pending
appeal."8
The Ninth Circuit upheld denial of the challenge on both
bases. The court first rejected petitioners' argument that they
enjoyed a substantive privacy right against governmental disclo-
Id. (citing WASH. REV CODE § 9A.44.130 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997)).
,Id. at 1082.
' 'Id. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.550.
"° Russel, 124 F.Sd at 1082.
1., Id. at 1083.
112 Id.
1 Id.
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sure, stating that "any such right to privacy, to the extent it ex-
ists at all, would protect only personal information," such as the
medical information at issue in Whalen v. Roe." 4 The informa-
tion subject to disclosure by notification in Washington was "al-
ready fully available to the public and is not constitutionally
protected... with the exception of the general vicinity of the
offender's residence (which is published) and the offender's
employer (which is collected but not released to the public).
Neither of these two items are generally considered 'private.""1'
5
Additionally, citing language in Paul v. Davis to the effect that
liberty is not implicated "'apart from some more tangible inter-
est[] such as employment,"' the court summarily concluded that
no such additional harm was present, and that no deprivation
therefore occurred 6
The court then turned to petitioners' procedural due proc-
ess claim, based on Washington's failure to provide them with
notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to their classifica-
tion. Bootstrapping petitioners' failed substantive privacy claim
to their procedural due process challenge, the court quickly
dispensed with the challenge: "Since we have already rejected
their privacy claims, we conclude that they have no liberty inter-
est at stake, and we hence reject their due process claims.""7
Russell was cited and followed by the District Court of Utah
in Femedeer v. Haun."8 There the petitioner raised a procedural
due process claim against Utah's notification provision,"9 which
makes available over the Internet without restriction and with-
out prior notice or opportunity to be heard: the registrant's
name; -home address; physical description; type of personal ve-
hicle (s) driven; any aliases; current photograph; crimes charged
with and convicted of; and other offense-related information.'
20
Relying on Russell, the Femedeer court concluded that "[s] uch in-
... Id. at 1094. Seesupra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
"' Russe, 124 F.3d at 1094 (citation omitted).
,'Id. (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
117 1&
"'35 F. Supp. 2d 852 (D. Utah 1999).
"' Id. at 855. Petitioner also raised ex post facto, double jeopardy, and bill of attainder
claims, all denied by the court because the Utah scheme was deemed non-punitive. Id at 859.
'" I& at 860-61.
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formation is not considered private . ... [It] 'is already fully
available to the public and is not constitutionally protected.' ...
Because Plaintiff cannot establish that disclosure impairs a con-
stitutionally-protected interest, he cannot establish a cognizable
injury to his reputation."'2 '
Identical results were achieved by federal district courts in
Michigan. In Doe v. Kelley, 22 the Western District of Michigan
addressed a challenge to the State's compulsory registration and
notification provision, which makes available upon request each
registrant's name, home address, physical description, date of
birth, and offense-related information.) The court summarily
denied the petitioners' claims for injunctive relief due to lack of
any privacy right, refusing, to find a protectible interest in "pre-
venting compilation and dissemination of truthful information
that is already, albeit less conveniently, a matter of public rec-
ord.'
24
The Eastern District of Michigan in Lanni v. Engle denied
another procedural due process claim to the Michigan notifica-
tion law, using strikingly similar language. 6 Even if a protecti-
ble interest against disclosure did exist, the Lanni court
reasoned, it would be of no moment because the petitioner
failed to demonstrate how notice and a hearing would serve
such an interest, given that Michigan requires all statutorily eli-
gible sex offenders to register and be subject to notification.
Because "a hearing would serve no purpose," the challenge was
"little more than an attack on the legislature's decision to sub-
ject sex offenders to registration and community notification." 2
Nor, as a fundamental matter, did notification violate any pri-
vacy interest:
In this case, the information made public by the Act is already a
matter of public record, to which no privacy rights attach. Therefore,
plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of a legitimate privacy
1 Id. at 861 (citing and quoting Russel 124 F.3d at 1094).
' 961 F. Supp. 1105 (W.D. Mich. 1997).
'Id, at 1107.
2 Id at 1112.
994 F. Supp. 849 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
2 See id. at 855.
'v Id.
2 Id.
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interest in preventing compilation and dissemination of truthful infor-
mation that is already, albeit less conveniently, available as a matter of
public record.2
In People v. Logan'30 the Illinois Court of Appeals, citing
Lanni, rejected a due process challenge to the Illinois registra-
tion and notification regime, which likewise provides neither
notice nor opportunity to be heard prior to notification.uI Ac-
cording to the Logan court, "the Registration Act merely com-
piles truthful, public information, and the Notification Law
makes this information more readily available. Any injury to the
defendant's reputation is a result of his underlying conviction of
a sex offense." Moreover, as in Lanni, because Illinois law sub-
jects all sex offenders covered by the Act to notification, "law en-
forcement authorities have no discretion to determine which
offenders would be subject to public dissemination. Thus, a
hearing would serve no purpose. " '"
Finally, in Cutshall v. Sundquist,'4 the Sixth Circuit over-
turned a lower court's enjoinment of the Tennessee notification
law, which allows law enforcement to "release relevant informa-
tion deemed necessary to protect the public concerning a spe-
cific sexual offender who is required to register," without prior
benefit of due process." 5 The Sixth Circuitjustified its rejection
of Cutshall's procedural due process claim on two bases. First,
seemingly presuming the existence of "stigma," as required by
Paul, the court failed to find a "plus" in the form of alleged loss
of and right to pursue employment, insofar as the Tennessee
law did not expressly "infringe[] upon Cutshall's ability to seek,
"' I at 856. Even more recently, the Eastern District rejected an identical claim using simi-
lar language:
The Court fails to discern how plaintiffs can claim deprivation ofa liberty interest resulting
from dissemination ofinformation already the subject of public record... [P]laintiff have
cited no authority for the proposition that the magnitude of dissemination, in and of itself,
is sufficient to trigger a deprivation of a liberty interest.
Akella v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 67 F. Supp. 2d 716,729 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
"0 705 N.E.2d 152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
Id. at 160-61 (citing Lanni, 994 F. Supp. at 855).
"'Id. (citing Lanni, 994 F. Supp. at 855).
Id. at 161 (citing Lanni, 994 F. Supp. at 855).
193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 471 (citing TENN. CODE § 40-39-106(c) (1994)). Notification can ensue by written
notice, "electronic transmission," or "on-line access to registration information." See TENN.
CODE § 40-39-106(d).
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obtain, and maintain a job.' 36 Next, the court concluded that
the requisite "plus" was lacking on the basis of any alleged viola-
tion of a privacy interest, narrowly construing the Supreme
Court's decision in RePorters' Committee.137 In short, the court
concluded:
Cutshall has failed to establish that the Act infringes any constitutionally
protected liberty or property interests in employment or privacy ....
Without the "plus" factor of employment or privacy, CutshaU has failed
to satisfy the stigma-plus test of PauL Therefore, he is not entitled to any
procedural protections under the Due Process Clause.1ss
Taken together, the courts failing to find a protectible lib-
erty interest evince a heavy reliance on the question of whether
registrants enjoy a "reasonable expectation of privacy" with re-
gard to notification information. They categorically find that
no such protectible expectation exists, drawing support from
the Supreme Court's cases that have failed to enunciate an ex-
press constitutional right against nondisclosure. To these courts
it does not matter that the information itself is only "public" in a
technical sense (i.e., in telephone directories and remote
criminal information databases), and is otherwise unavailable in
the consolidated, user-friendly form permitted by registries.
Importantly, also, these courts then apply this substantive result
to the procedural analysis, thereby concluding that notification
does not implicate a liberty interest sufficient to warrant due
process protection when none otherwise statutorily exists.
B. COURTS FINDING A LIBERTY INTEREST
In the alternative, courts applying the "stigma-plus" test of
Paul v. Davis have been much more inclined to find that a lib-
Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 480.
"s Id. at 481 (citing and discussing United States Dept. ofJustice v. Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 751-56 (1989)).
'm Id. at 482.
In dissent, Judge Nathaniel Jones strongly condemned the majority's refusal to find a due
process violation. According toJudge Jones:
The need to hold a due process hearing is made more acute by the fact that the
Tennessee Act views all sex offenders the same, regardless of the severity of their crimes(s)
.... Because the Tennessee Act forgoes such categorization, a due process hearing is of
utmost importance, especially in the case of sex offenders whose crimes are less severe; the
harm to them, should inaccurate disclosure to the public occur, would be great indeed.
Id. at 484 (Jones,J., dissenting).
" 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Seesupra notes 79-96 and accompanying text.
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erty interest is jeopardized by notification. In Paul, the Court
established that "reputation alone, apart from some more tan-
gible interest such as employment, is [not] either 'liberty' or
'property' by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protec-
tion of the Due Process Clause.' 4 0  Rather, the government
must "alter 'a right or status previously recognized by state law,'
for it is that 'alteration, officially removing the interest from the
recognition [and protection] previously afforded by the State,
which [the Court has] found sufficient"' to trigger due proc-
ess.141 In other words, it takes "harm to reputation in addition to
some other impediment, to establish a constitutional depriva-
tion.'
1 42
As a threshold matter, all courts applying the "stigma-plus"
test readily conclude that notification has negative effects on
reputation. Like the accused "active shoplifter" in Pau4 sex of-
fenders subject to community notification suffer the infamy as-
sociated with being labeled in a derogatory manner by the
State. Moreover, although registrants have already suffered
reputational harm because of their public prosecution and con-
viction for a sex offense, notification entails a more acute and
sustained harm. Offenders are consciously labeled by the gov-
ernment such things as "repetitive" and "compulsive"1 4 crimi-
nals with an especially "high risk" of re-offending, 45 and,
depending on applicable law, can suffer this public ignominy
"o Pau, 424 U.S. at 701.
"' W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1219 (D. N.J. 1996) (citations omitted), rev'd on other
grounds, E.B. v. Veriero, 119 F.Sd 1077 (3d Cir. 1997).
,'Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456,467 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
'See, e.g., id. at 468 ("[T] here is no genuine dispute that the dissemination of the informa-
tion contemplated by the [New York law] to the community at large is potentially harmful to
plaintiffs' personal reputations."); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 419 (N.J. 1995) ("[Public notifi-
cation] would expose plaintiff to public opprobrium, not only by identifying him as a sex of-
fender but also labeling him as potentially currendy dangerous, and thereby undermining his
reputation and standing in the community.").
Sm e.g., Poritz, 662 A.2d at 420.
'See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-902 (Michie 1999) ("The General Assembly finds that sex
offenders pose a high risk of reoffending after release from custody.... ."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
4002 (Supp. 1999) ("The Legislature finds that sex offenders present a high risk to commit re-
peat offenses."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.5 (1999) ("The General Assembly recognizes that sex
offenders often pose a high risk of engaging in sex offenses even after being released. .. .");
S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-400 (Law Co-op. 1999) ("Statistics show that sex offenders often pose a
high risk of re-offending.").
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well past the end of their prison sentence, and, indeed, for the
rest of their lives' 46
The "plus" requirement of Paul, however, has received more
diverse judicial interpretation. Although it made no express
reference to Paul or the "stigma-plus" test, the Western District
of Michigan in Doe v. Kelley, 1 7 discussed above, failed to find a
protectible liberty interest relative to Michigan's notification
provision. According to the Kelley court, the law:
does nothing more than compile truthful, public information and make
it available. To the extent public use of such information may result in
damage to plaintiffs' reputation or may destabilize their employment
and other community relations, such effects are purely speculative on
the present record and, in any event, would appear to flow most directly
from plaintiffs' own convicted misconduct and from private citizens' re-
actions thereto, and only tangentially from state action.
14 9
Likewise, as discussed above, the Sixth Circuit in Cutshall re-
fused to find that Tennessee's notification law satisfied the
"plus" standard.150
All other courts employing the "plus" test with respect to
notification, however, have found it satisfied, with several deci-
sions conceiving the privacy loss associated with notification it-
self as a "plus" sufficient to trigger due process. Perhaps most
prominent among these is the New Jersey Supreme Court's
1995 decision in Doe v. Poritz.151 In Poritz, the court concluded
that notification implicated protectible liberty interests in repu-
tation and privacy for due process purposes,15 2 despite having
first concluded that any fundamental substantive right of privacy
was "substantially outweigh [ed]" by the State's interest in public
disclosure. According to Poritz, "It]he harm to plaintiffs
" See supra note 46.
961 F. Supp. 1105 (W.D. Mich. 1997).
' Id. at 1112. See also supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
"9Kelley, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1112.
Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466,482 (6th Cir. 1999).
662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).
152 Id. at 411.
" Id. at 411, 417 ("We deal here not the question of substantive constitutional deprivation,
for we have held that there is none.").
In its substantive analysis, the Poitz court singled out for special concern that the registrant's
home address would be divulged. Id at 408 ("We believe that public disclosure of plaintiff's
home address does implicate privacy interests."). At the same time, the court made clear its
concern for the overall scope of information subject to disclosure: "the issue here is not whether
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reputation, when coupled with the incursion on his right to pri-
vacy, although justified by the compelling state interest, consti-
tutes a protectible interest."15 4  Other courts have likewise
deemed the privacy loss attending notification a sufficient "plus"
to warrant due process protection.
1 5
The loss or foreclosure of employment has also been identi-
fied as a sufficient additional "plus," in contrast to the Sixth Cir-
cuit decision in Cutshall. Judge Myron Thompson of the Middle
District of Alabama, for instance, recently addressed Alabama's
State Community Notification Act, which, without providing
due process, permits widespread notification on "criminal sex
offenders." 15 6 After first identifying several colorable "plus" fac-
tors that served to deprive registrants of "rights previously held
under State Law" (including provisions of the Act that preclude
the right to change residences without first notifying the gov-
ernment, limit residence and work locations, and bar the right
to legally change one's name),5 7 Judge Thompson focused on
the non-statutory limits on registrants' freedom to pursue em-
ployment. There could be "little doubt" that prospective em-
ployers:
will think twice before doing business with an individual deemed to be a
likely recidivist and a danger to the community, and, because the Act al-
lows government officials to notify communities through the local media
and the Internet, it is likely that at least some of those prospective busi-
ness partners will become aware of the State's warning. To the extent
that such opportunities are foreclosed, the plaintiff will have satisfied the
"plus" of the stigma-plus test. 58
plaintiff has a privacy interest in his address, but whether the inclusion of plaintiff's address,
along with other information, implicates any privacy interest" Id at 409. "In this case, where as
a result of the information disclosed under the Notification Law, plaintiff may be exposed to un-
invited harassment, we conclude that disclosure of plaintiff's home address, particularly when
coupled with the other information disclosed, implicates a privacy interest." Id. In the end,
however, the court characterized the interest against nondisclosure as "only a most limited ex-
pectation of privacy," insufficient in relative terms to allege a successful substantive due process
violation. Id. at 411.
"AId. at 419.
See Doe v. Pryor, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231 (M.D. Ala. 1999); Roe v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp.
174, 196-97 (D. Mass. 1998). See also Cutshall v. Sundquist, 980 F. Supp. 928, 932 (M.D. Tenn.
1997), reu'd on othergrounds, 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999).
" Pryor, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 1225. The Act is discussed supra note 51.
"Ptyor, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 1231.
Id. at 1232. Judge Thompson identified the deprivation of a "legitimate privacy interest in
[plaintiff's] home address" as yet another non-statutory "plus." Id
1999] 1195
1196 WAYNE A. LOGAN [Vol. 89
Threat to future, not merely present, employment has been
deemed a sufficient "plus" by the District of NewJersey as well.'5 9
In Doe v. Pataki,'60 the Southern District of New York
deemed a sufficient "plus" the potentially life-long legal re-
quirement for registrants to maintain and update their registry
information with the government. Noting that any failure on
the part of sex offenders to timely register risked exposure to
criminal prosecution, the court stated that:
there can be no genuine dispute that registration alters the legal status
of all convicted sex offenders subject to the Act.... These requirements
obviously encroach on the liberty of convicted sex offenders, and, there-
fore, they suffer a tangible impairment of a right in addition to mere
. . 161
harm to reputation.
Perhaps the most expansive finding of "plus" is reflected in
the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
which found a protectible interest to arise in the context of
"Level 1" classification, entailing the Commonwealth's least in-
vasive form of notification:
The combination of the following circumstances persuades us that
plaintiff has a liberty and privacy interest protected by the Constitution
that entitles him to due process: (1) the requirement that he register
with local police; (2) the disclosure of accumulated personal informa-
tion on request; (3) the possible harm to his earning capacity; (4) the
harm to his reputation; and, most important, (5) the statutory branding
of him as public danger, a sex offender. That statutory classification im-
plicitly announces that, in the eyes of the State, the plaintiff presents a
risk of committing a sex offense.
"1 W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1219 (D. NJ. 1996) (noting that "stigma-plus" can be es-
tablished "by coupling the reputational damage with the loss of employment opportunities. .
(footnote omitted).
'03 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
Id. at 468. See also WP., 931 F. Supp. at 1219 (noting that "stigma-plus" can be established
"by coupling the reputational damage with the loss of employment opportunities or, more di-
rectiy, the continuing legal status as a registrant and the duties imposed as a result") (footnote
omitted).
162 Doe v. Attorney Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1013 (Mass. 1997). See also Doe v. Attorney Gen.,
715 N.E.2d 37, 44-45 (Mass. 1999) (holding that due process requires "individualized" hearing
as precondition of registration and notification).
Recently, the Supreme Court of Oregon embraced an only slightly less expansive view, find-
ing that in addition to the "obvious reputational interest that is at stake," there exists "an interest
in avoiding the social ostracism, loss of employment opportunities, and significant likelihood of
verbal and, perhaps, even physical harassment likely to follow from designation." Noble v.
Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 964 P.2d 990, 995-96 (Or. 1998).
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Finally, as the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently held,
the statutory provision of immunity to governmental officials in
relation to the execution of their notification duties can serve to
deprive registrants of a previously existing right, sufficient to sat-
isfy the "plus" requirement.
1 63
C. ANALYSIS
The opinions in the two categories discussed above are
noteworthy not just for their divergent results, but also for their
distinct analytic approaches. To date, all courts rejecting pro-
cedural due process challenges to notification have done so be-
cause they discern no protectible privacy interest to be at
stake.1  This approach, however, conflates substantive and pro-
cedural due process analysis,'6 a perhaps predictable confusion
because both species of due process regard the existence of a
protectible interest as a threshold requirement.16 However, as
See In re C.M., 578 N.W.2d 391, 397-98 (Minn. Ct App. 1998) (construing Remedies
Clause of Minnesota Constitution, which provides that "[e]very person is entitled to a certain
remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive to his person ... or character"
MINN. CONST. art. I § 8.). The federal Jacob Wetterling Act and at least thirty states provide
immunity for "good faith" conduct in relation to registration and notification. See Stephen R.
McAllister, Megan's Laws: Wise Public Policy or Ill-Considered Public Folly?, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
1, 18 (1998).
"a See supra notes 105-38 and accompanying text.
' See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 99, §§ 14.6, 14.7, 17.4 (surveying distinctions). See also
Henry Paul Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 979, 980 n.18 (1986) ("[T] he state must make a two-fold justification for injuries
that it inflicts: procedural-the harm may be imposed only in the context of certain procedural
safeguards-and substantive-the harm must be based on an adequate reason.").
The Supreme Court itself has been at pains to delineate the two distinct modes of constitu-
tional inquiry: "The point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause provides that certain sub-
stantive rights-life, liberty, and property-cannot be deprived except pursuant to
constitutionally adequate procedures. The categories of substance and procedure are distinct.
Were the rule otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a mere tautology." Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 543,546 (1985).
'"See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 735 n.18 (1996) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[P]rivacy no-
tions appear to be inextricably interwoven with the considerations which require that a State not
single out an individual for punishment outside the judicial process."); ROTUNDA & NOWAK, su-
pra note 99, § 17.4, at 28 ("The concept of liberty in the due process clauses is also the basis for
the 'substantive due process' requirement that legislation must relate to a legitimate end of gov-
ernment."). As Professor Tribe observes in his treatise:
Including particular activities within the constitutional definition of "liberty" or
.property" is not, of course, the equivalent of granting those activities total immunity from
government regulation or deprivation. Nevertheless, such inclusion usually implies a bur-
den ofjustification for every substantive curtailment of the interest in question, and always
implies constitutional recognition of a procedural right to be heard even when a concededly valid
government rule infringing that interest is enforced.
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several courts have held,167 and as discussed at greater length
next, this redundancy does not justify the failure to find a pro-
tectible interest in the form of privacy for purposes of the "plus"
criterion. Furthermore, there are sound reasons to conclude
that the consequences of community notification amply satisfy
the Paul "stigma-plus" test more generally.
1. Notification and Its Impact on Privacy
Despite the Supreme Court's ambiguous stance with regard
to informational privacyr' and Paul's express holding that the
constitutional right to privacy does not prevent disclosure of "a
record of an official act such as an arrest,"'6 9 the nature and ex-
tent of informational disclosure entailed in notification compels
ajudicial finding of a protectible interest.
Most fundamentally, the mere fact that an offender's crimi-
nal history is "public" in a technical sense, in no way resolves the
constitutional question. As the Supreme Court stated with re-
spect to the information gathered in the "rap-sheet" deemed
protectible in Reporters' Committee, "[p]lainly there is a vast dif-
ference between the public records that might be found after a
diligent search" of local police files, and the "summary located
in a single clearinghouse of information,, 171 such as occurs with
notification laws. In dismissing what it called respondents'
"cramped notion of personal privacy," the Reporters' Committee
Court stated "the fact that an event is not wholly private does
not mean that an individual has no interest in limiting disclo-
sure or dissemination of the information.''1 Notification, as the
Supreme Court of New Jersey has observed, similarly "links vari-
ous bits of information-name, appearance, address and
crime-that otherwise might remain unconnected.' 2
TRIBE, supra note 55, § 10-8, at 682 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
" See, e.g., Roe v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp. 194, 196-97 (D. Mass. 1998) (finding privacy and lib-
erty right); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367,419 (N.J. 1995) (same).
'"See supra notes 56-73 and accompanying text.
'"Pau4 424 U.S. at 713.
"' United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters' Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749,763 (1989).
... Id. at 763, 770.
'"Poit, 662 A.2d at 411.
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However public any of those individual pieces of information may
be, were it not for the Notification Law, those connections might never
be made .... Those convicted of crime may have no cognizable privacy
interest in the fact of their conviction, but the Notification Law, given
the compilation and dissemination of information, nonetheless impli-
cates a privacy interest. The interests in privacy may fade when the in-
formation is a matter of public record, but they are not non-existent.73
In addition to being distinctive for concentrating such in-
formation, and making it more readily available, notification
laws are unique because the information they commonly dis-
close is of a far more sensitive, less public nature than otherwise
publicly available. In particular, in addition to requiring sex of-
fenders to provide offense information and a photograph, in-
formation publicly disclosed with impunity in Paul,'74 states
disseminate a broad array of other information including, most
significantly, home and work address information.'7 5 Address
information, in particular, has been singled out for special con-
cern by the courts. The Third Circuit, for instance, very re-
cently dismissed the argument that privacy is vitiated by the
mere fact that addresses are typically reposed in publicly avail-
able telephone directories. Acknowledging the "general under-
standing that home addresses are entitled to some privacy
protection, whether or not so required by a statute, 7 6 the court
in Paul P. v. Verniero supported its inference with the recogni-
"3 Id. The District of NewJersey has also singled out for constitutional significance the un-
precedented form in which notification information is packaged and made available:
Megan's Law goes well beyond all previous provisions for public access to an individ-
ual's criminal history. Indeed, unlike previous access provisions, registration and public
notification ensure that, rather than lying potentially dormant in a courthouse record
room, a sex offender's former mischief-whether habitual or once-off-shall remain with
him for life, as long as he remains a resident of NewJersey.
Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666, 689 (D.NJ. 1995), afl'd, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996).
.. See supra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-21(3) (1998) (home address, physical description, photo);
AlASKA STAT. § 18.65.087(b) (Michie 1999) (home and work address, date of birth, photo);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 846E-3 (Michie 1998) (home and work address, photo, and personal
vehicle information); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4907 (1995 & Supp. 1998) (home address, photo,
date of birth, personal vehicle information, and occupation and name of employer); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28-727 (West Supp. 1999) (home address, date of birth, and description in-
formation); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-490 (Law Co-op. 1999) (home address, photo, identifying
characteristics, and date of birth); TENN. CODEANN. § 40-39-103 (1997) (home address, photo,
and date of birth). Offense history information, often quite detailed in nature, is also dissemi-
nated as a matter of course.
"' Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396,404 (3d Cir. 1999).
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tion "that a significant number of persons ... choose to list
their telephones privately, because they regard their home ad-
dresses to be private information."'177
Moreover, and of special significance here, the dissemina-
tion of address information raises concern for potential physical
harm or harassment, a potential discussed at length in the Su-
preme Court's 1994 opinion in United States Department of Defense
v. Federal Labor Relations Authority. There, Justice Thomas fretted
over the prospect of federal employees receiving unsolicited
mailings or phone calls from aggressive union organizers. 71 If
disclosure of one's address implicates a privacy right under such
circumstances that in the Court's words is "nontrivial" and "far
from insignificant,"'179 there most surely must be some protecti-
ble privacy interest relative to the disclosure of the addresses of
sex offenders. 80 Indeed, the substantial record of incidences of
vigilantism and harassment of registrants would appear to amply
validate this position. 8' Merely because such harm stems from
the behavior of "third parties" (i.e., fellow citizens) in no way
177 Id.
See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
' See United States Dep't of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 490, 501
(1994). See also Kalistrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1063 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding a
fundamental privacy right implicated by governmental disclosure of personal information con-
tained in personnel files of police officers, based on possible threats to "personal security").
A decision in the Eastern District of Michigan addressed a novel twist on this issue. See
Akella v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 67 F. Supp. 2d 716 (E.D. Mich. 1999). In Akella, home-
owners claimed that their due process rights were violated when the address for their home er-
roneously remained on the Michigan registry for three years as a result of a prior resident's
registrant status, and Michigan law provided no mechanism to correct the error. The plaintiffs
alleged the "[tihe stigma attached to living in a residence wrongly attributed to a sex offender
may put many people in danger that they are not aware of." Id. at 731. Citing Kallstror, the
court rejected the claim because plaintiffs failed to allege that the incorrect listing subjected
them to a "'substantial risk of serious bodily harm.'" Id. at 732 (citing Kailsrom, 136 F.3d at
1064).
" See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 409 (NJ. 1995) ("[W]here as a result of the information
disclosed under the Notification Law, plaintiff may be exposed to uninvited harassment, we con-
clude that disclosure of plaintiff's home address, particularly when coupled with the other in-
formation disclosed, implicates a privacy interest."). Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673
(1977) ("Among the historic liberties... protected [by the Constitution] is a right to be free
from ... unjustified [State] intrusions on personal security.").
.' See supra note 45. See also Kabat, supra note 46, at 339-40 n.34 (listing numerous instances
of vigilantism); Tracy L. Silva, Comment, Dial "1-900-PERVERT" and Other Statutory Measures That
Provide Public Notification of Sex Offenders, 48 SMU L. REV. 1961, 1983-85 (1995) (listing other vigi-
lante acts).
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should alter this conclusion, as some courts have held.12  Even
assuming that government has no general duty to protect indi-
viduals from harm by third parties,'83 the constitutional tableau
is less clear when the government creates the danger, 4 such as
occurs when the government informs an entire anxious com-
munity that a sex offender is in its midst."
Finally, it is important to recognize that notification entails
disclosure of non-public information, further warranting pro-
tection. The publicly available information is merely the base-
line information the State uses, supplemented by information
often obtained from the registrant, that is used to make the in-
herently stigmatizing "sex offender" designation. As the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court has observed:
Constitutional privacy interests are implicated in these cases be-
cause the information to be disseminated would be obtained from the
offenders themselves and by reason of their required acts of registration.
The damage to their reputations resulting from such dissemination
stigmatizes them as currently dangerous sex offenders, can harm their
earning capacities, and can cause them to be objects of derision in the1 86
community.
In short, notwithstanding that public conviction serves to
lessen offenders' expectations of privacy, it does not eliminate
them. 87 As the Supreme Court itself has emphasized, in deter-
mining "whether due process requirements apply in the first
," See, e.g., Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.Sd 1079, 1093 n.10 (9th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Kelley, 961 F.
Supp. 1105, 1112 (W.D. Mich. 1997). See also Doe v. Pataki, 20 F.3d 1263, 1279-80 (2d Cir. 1997)
(acknowledging that notification is "doubtless the 'but for' cause of some" acts of vigilantism,
but rejecting that such acts are "fairly attributable to community notification" per se).
'" SeeDeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't ofSocial Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989).
IU Id.
.. SeeJames W. Whitman, What is Wrong With Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055,
1088 (1998) ("Once the state stirs up public opprobrium against an offender, it cannot really
control the way the public treats the offender .... When our government dangles a sex of-
fender or a drunk before the public, it has vanishingly little control over how the public treats
the person."). Nor is it significant that many notification laws expressly prescribe criminal pen-
alties for those making undue use of notification information to harass or commit acts of vigi-
lantism against registrants. See Caroline Louise Lewis, The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children
and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act: An Unconstitutional Deprivation of the Right to Privacy
and SubstantiveDue Process, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 89, 106-12 (1996) (arguing same).
""Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 697 N.E.2d 512,518 n.12 (Mass. 1998).
,' See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 411 (N.J. 1995) ("The interests in privacy may fade when
the (offense history] information is a matter of public record, but they are not non-existent.").
Cf Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568 (CAD.C. 1984) (Scalia, J.) ("Even the
public outcast's remaining good reputation, limited in scope though it may be, is not inconse-
quential.").
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place, [the court] must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature
of the interest at stake."188 The perceived "severity" or "weight"
of the deprivation, on the other hand, is a factor to be weighed
in the evaluation of the form and extent of procedural protec-
tions to be afforded, pursuant to the three-part balancing test
set forth in Matthews v. Eldridge.'89
2. The Paul "Stigma-Plus" Test
There is also sound reason to conclude that more general
application of the Supreme Court's "stigma-plus" test warrants
due process safeguards. Having one's criminal sexual offense
history made public and being labeled a "repetitive sex of-
fender," or the like, plainly calls into question one's "good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity."' 90 Indeed, being labeled
an "active shoplifter," as in Paul, or an alleged alcoholic, as in
Constantineau, pales in comparison, given society's acute disdain
for sex offenders, 9' as manifest in the repeated acts of vigilan-
tism experienced by registrants subject to community notifica-
192tion.
" Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972). See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 576 (1975); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 378-79 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan,J., con-
curring).
' 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) ("[Tihe process due in a particular case is a function of the
severity of the deprivation."). The upshot of the Matthews test, Massachusetts' highest court re-
cently stated, is that "[d]eprivation of greater individual liberty interests requires greater proce-
dures and stronger countervailing State interests." Doe v. Attorney Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1010
(Mass. 1997).
'"Roth, 408 U.S. at573 (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,437 (1971)).
See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. As the Middle District of Alabama recently
stated:
While it might seem that a convicted felon could have little left of his good name,
community notification... will inflict a greater stigma than would result from conviction
alone. Notification will clearly brand the plaintiff as a "criminal sex offender" within the
meaning of the Community Notification Act-a "badge of infamy" that he will have to wear
for at least 25 years-and strongly implies that he is a likely recidivist and a danger to his
community.
Doe v. Pryor, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231 (M.D. Ala. 1999). See also Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d
818, 829 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing the "stigmatizing consequences of being labeled a sex of-
fender"); Doe v. Attorney Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1016 (Mass. 1997) (Fried, J., concurring) (re-
ferring to "continuing, intrusive, and humiliating regulation of the person himself" associated
with registration and notification).
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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This stigma is increased immeasurably as a result of the
communicative methods used in notification systems which, un-
like the limited posting of flyers within local stores at issue in
Paul and Constintineau, involve use of the media, the Internet,
flyers and postings, and even door-to-door visits by law enforce-
ment (or the registrant himself) to disseminate registrant in-
formation. 193 In actuality, as the Supreme Court of Oregon
recently observed, conceiving of the issue in terms of "reputa-
tion" understates what is at issue. When the government gath-
ers and synthesizes harmful information in order to label one of
its citizens in a derogatory manner "the interest of the person to
be labeled goes beyond mere reputation .... It is an interest in
knowing when the government is moving against you and why it
has singled you out for special attention. It is an interest in
avoiding the secret machinations of a Star Chamber.'
94
The "plus" requirement of Paul would appear satisfied as
well. As discussed, the laws adversely affect personal privacy be-
cause of the release of home and work address information. 95
The laws also modify the basic legal status of freed sex offenders
who, although they have served their sentences, must maintain
their registration for perhaps the rest of their lives,'9 under
threat of prosecution if they do not.19 7  Moreover, registrants
typically suffer statutorily imposed limits on the places they are
permitted to live 98 and their capacity to change names,'9 and
... See supra note 35.
" Noble v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 964 P.2d 990, 995 (Or. 1998).
See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text
"'See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11-56.835 (Michie 1999) (class "C" felony); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-3824 (West 1999) (class "4" felony); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 28-729 (West Supp. 1999)
(felony); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 9A.44.130(9) (West Supp. 1999) (class "C" felony).
'w Sem e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-26 (1999); MINN. STAT. § 244.052(sub. 3)(k), (sub.4) (1999).
See also Town Restricts Sex Offender, DENVER ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Aug. 26, 1999, at 39A, available in
LEXIS, News Group File (relating that local town board of Denver suburb enacted an ordinance
prohibiting more than one registered sex offender from living together). Plainly, such limits
implicate protectible "associational rights" of offenders. See generally TRIBE, supra note 55, § 15-
17. Although such living constraints are commonly imposed as probation or parole conditions,
the duration of registration and notification typically extends far beyond customary probation
or parole periods.
"' See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1279.5 (West Supp. 1999) (no change unless "it is in the
best interest ofjustice to grant [the change] and that doing so will not adversely affect the pub-
lic safety."); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101 (West 1999) (no change for duration of required
registration); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 547:3-i(II) (1997 & Supp. 1999) (allowed only if registrant
"makes a compelling showing that a name change is necessary").
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are even required to pay fees to help cover the operational costs
of the registration and notification systems.
Of all the obvious "pluses," however, two stand out with re-
spect to the Supreme Court's settled jurisprudence. First, of-
fenders suffer palpable limits on their "occupational liberty.,
20
'
As ChiefJudge Richard Posner has noted, "[t] he distinction be-
tween mere defamation and an infringement of liberty of occu-
pation is merely one of degree, especially when the defamation
relates to a person's fitness for a particular type of employment,
but it is a distinction to which the courts are committed."
20 2
Registration and notification laws satisfy this standard, because
they discourage employers from hiring or retaining eligible of-
fenders, and at times expressly bar offenders from certain em-
ployment.23 These limits, in turn, are backed up by the threat
of civil fines for employers should a registrant not be termi-
nated. 4
A second obvious "plus" comes in the form of the wide-
spread grants of statutory immunity to government officials in-
volved in the registration and notification process, grants which
effectively preclude eligible offenders from seeking redress in
the courts. As noted earlier, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
identified the legislative grant of immunity as a "plus" because it
rendered nugatory the "Remedies Clause" of the Minnesota
Constitution. 5  Numerous other state constitutions expressly
provide a similar right of access or remedy.2  Even in the ab-
2co See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-8307(4) (Supp. 1999); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/3(c) (6)
(West Supp. 1999).
20' Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976) (holding that stigma must "foreclose" one's free-
dom to take advantage of employment opportunities). See also Connecticut v. Gabbert, 119 S.
Ct 1292, 1225-26 (1999) ("[T]he liberty component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Proc-
ess Clause includes some generalized due process right to choose one's field of private occupa-
on .... "); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957) (holding that a
state cannot, without affording due process, foreclose a range of employment opportunities).
Olivieri v. Rodriguez, 122 F.3d 406,408 (7th Cir. 1997).
". See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a) (1999) (school or child care facilities); MINN. STAT. §
244.052(sub.3) (k), (sub.4) (same) (1999).
See, e.g., IND. CODEANN. § 5-2-12-12 (West Supp. 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 584(F)
(West 1999).
Seesupra note 163 and accompanying text.
See e.g., KAN. CONST., Bill of Rights, § 18 ("All persons, for injuries suffered in person,
reputation or property shall have remedy by due course of law.. . ."); OR. CONST., art. I, § 10
("[E~very man shall have remedy... for injury done him in his person, property, or reputa-
tion."). See generallyJonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of tle Open Courts
[Vol. 891204
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sence of a constitutional guarantee, however, a fair reading of
Paul compels that statutory immunity, which effectively bars the
right of access to the courts, satisfies the "plus" test. In holding
that damage to "mere reputation" was not actionable for consti-
tutional purposes, the Paul majority attached obvious impor-
tance to the fact that state law otherwise provided a plaintiff an
avenue of redress and access to judicial process. °7 Immunity,
however, precludes such redress, raising clear constitutional
208
concern.
Further support for fulfillment of the Paul test is found in
the strikingly similar context of "child abuse registries," with
courts evincing an obvious sensitivity for the liberty interest im-
plicated by that form of governmental stigmatization. For in-
stance, the Eighth Circuit has identified a protectible interest in
reputation jeopardized by the stigma associated with being
placed on such a registry, accompanied by "pluses" of losses in
privacy and the stability and autonomy of family relationships.209
Clause of State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REv. 1279 (1995); David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65
TEMP. L. REv. 1197 (1992).
"' Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) ("[Plaintiff's] interest in reputation is simply one
of a number which the State may protect against injury by virtue of its tort law, providing a fo-
rum for vindication of those interests by means of damages actions."). Professors Rotunda and
Nowak have observed with respect to Pau-
The ruling that mere injury to reputation does not constitute a deprivatioi of liberty
thus may mean only that the injured person must be satisfied with a tort remedy which fol-
lows the defamatory action. If the State had no tort action for libel against such officials-
if the state granted its public officials immunity to defame private citizens while otherwise recognizing
[a] defamation action-it would raise a much more serious question as to whether the State
was depriving someone of liberty or property by allowing the government to damage his
name with no hope of rectifying the harm done.
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 99, § 17.4, at 66 (emphasis added). They add thatJustice Stev-
ens "has indicated that he believes this 'later process' is a better rationale for the opinion." Id
(citing Ingraham v. Wright, 480 U.S. 651,700-02 (1977) (Stevens,J, dissenting)).
See Paul 424 U.S. at 710-11 ("[Liberty interests arise] by virtue of the fact that they have
been initially recognized and protected by state law, and we have repeatedly ruled that the pro-
cedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment apply whenever the State seeks to remove or
significantly alter that protected status.") (footnote omitted).
See Bohn v. County of Dakota, 772 F.2d 1433, 1436 n.4 (8th Cir. 1985). Cf Watson v.
Colorado Dep't of Soc. Servs., 841 P.2d 299, 307-09 (Colo. 1992) (recognizing a liberty interest
based on family stability and autonomy as a result of being placed on child abuse registry, but
finding no due process violation because the information was kept confidential). But seePaul P.
v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding family-related effects of notification too
"indirect" to implicate privacy interest under federal law).
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, construing the State Constitution, found a liberty
interest to be at stake in conjunction with placement of the names of two parents on a child ne-
glect registry, which was not disseminated to the public at-large. See In re Lana & Leon Bagley,
513 A.2d 331 (N.H. 1986). Recognizing the stigma that attended the governmental determina-
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Similarly, in Valmonte v. Bane1 the Second Circuit found Paul
satisfied with respect to the New York child abuse registry.'
Significantly, while the information was not disseminated to the
public at large, employers in the child care field were required
to consult the registry to determine whether potential employ-
ees were listed. The Valmonte court found that inclusion on the
registry was sufficiently stigmatizing under Pau 212 and that the
statutorily mandated revelation to prospective employers in the
child-care field alone amounted to a "specific deprivation of
[plaintiffs] opportunity to seek employment."21 3 The New York
Court of Appeals reached the identical result with respect to the
New York child abuse registry,2 4 as have courts in New Jersey,1 5
216 27Georgia, and Nebraska! with respect to their registries.
tion, the court reasoned that at the moment of their placement on the registry the plaintiffs'
"lives became a little more complicated and a little less free." I& at 338. See also Minnehan v.
Department of Soc. Servs., No. 98-4687, 1999 WL 706653, at *12 n.17 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 14,
1999) ("[R]eliance on Paul v. Davis for the proposition that governmental injury to reputation
implicates no liberty interest unless that injury also alters some other right or status cannot pos-
sibly be read to suggest that such injury is inconsequential. Manifestly, it is not.").
210 18 F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1994).
Id. at 999.
'
1 2 Id. at 999-1000.
Id. at 1001. Although the record reflected that the plaintiff had worked only as a "para-
professional in the school system," the Valmnte court accepted as true that "she would look for a
position in the child care field but for her presence on the Central Register." Id. at 999. The
actual impediment to the plaintiff's job prospects was two-fold "by operation of law": (1) poten-
tial employers would be informed specifically about her status, making thesh less likely to hire
her; and (2) even if they wished to hire her, the NewYork law required that they provide written
reason why they deemed her "appropriate" for employment in the child care field, a further im-
pediment. Id. at 1001.
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit "assume[d]" that the government's listing of the plaintiff on
the Virginia registry implicated the plaintiff's liberty interest, because "this listing indirectly cost
him his job." Perry v. City of Norfolk, No. 98-2284, 1999 WL 731100, *5 (4th Cir. Sept. 20,
1999).
"' See Lee T.T. v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 1250 (N.Y. 1996). The New York Court of Ap-
peals, with similar analysis, has also found Paulsatisfied with respect to those suspected of abuse
and listed on the State Nurse Aid Registry, which involves dissemination to the public at-large.
See In re Miller v. DeBuono, 689 N.E.2d 518, 522 (N.Y. 1997). The Miller court stated: "by pub-
licly branding petitioner a patient abuser, the State's action affects not only her occasion for
employment in the residential health care industry, but also may well extend to prevent future
employment opportunities in any arena, thereby placing a tangible burden on her employment
prospects." Id.
25 See New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.R., 715 A.2d 308, 315 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1998); In reAllegations of Sexual Abuse at East Park High School, 714 A.2d 339, 346-
47 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
..
6 See State v.Jackson, 496 S.E.2d 912, 915 (Ga. 1998). The court distinguished Pay4 reason-
ing that "more than Jackson's reputation is involved. The State is attempting to take further of-
ficial action against him, based on the same alleged acts that underlie his criminal prosecution."
Id.
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In short, if in Constantineau the limits placed on the plain-
tiffs right "to purchase or obtain liquor" sufficed as a "plus,"
21 8
the litany of harms and deprivations associated with sex of-
fender notification manifestly do also.
3. Fundamental Fairness
Beyond the core constitutional rationale just discussed, ba-
sic fairness dictates that notice and an opportunity to be heard
precede community notification.
As a threshold matter, although notification is justified "to
protect the public from registered offenders,"219 it is clear that
the broad scope of predicate offenses triggering registration
and notification, including mere attempts to commit specified
220
crimes, can overshoot this mark. For example, in State v. Pat-
221 pttoeterson, the petitioner pled guilty to burglary and misdemeanor
theft in relation to his taking of several items of female under-
wear from his neighbor's apartment. The trial court concluded
that he therefore was required to register under the Kansas Sex
Offender Registration Act, which permits public access to the
registry.2  The central question before the Kansas Court of Ap
peals was whether the acts were "sexually motivated," statutorily
defined as meaning "that one of the purposes for which the de-
fendant committed the crime was for the purpose of the defen-
dant's sexual gratification., ,2 23 The Patterson court held in the
affirmative, inferring that the Kansas Legislature "was con-
cerned with those offenders who commit crimes not commonly
2'3 See Shearer v. Leuenberger, 591 N.W.2d 762, 777 (Neb. 1999). According to the court,
"[t]he placement of Shearer's name on the Registry ... was required by state law. It had the im-
primatur of official action, which usually implies that the information at issue has been tried and
tested according to the dictates of due process...." Id.
218 See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1996) (summarizing result in Wisconsin v. Con-
stantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)). See also In re C.M., 578 N.W.2d 391, 398 n.5 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1998) ("[T he great weight of the stigma [associated with being labeled a Level III sex of-
fender] compensates for the relative uncertainty in establishing the other element.").
"' See Final Guidelines, supra note 30, at 581. See also 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e) (2) (1995 & Supp.
1999) (specifying that jurisdictions "shall release relevant information that is necessary to pro-
tect the public...").
' See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (a) (3) (A) (viii) (I) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.151 (3)
(Michie 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 582 (West
1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-430(c) (Law Co-op. 1999).
963 P.2d 436 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998).
See id. at 437.
Id. at 438 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(b) (12)).
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called sex crimes, but which nevertheless are criminal offenses
committed by persons seeking sexual gratification."
224
Likewise, Washington State requires registration of those
committing any crime "for the purpose of sexual gratifica-
tion,2 2 5 Indiana for "vicarious sexual gratification, ',226 and Colo-
rado for conviction of "unlawful sexual behavior."227  In
California, statutory law permits courts to require registration
"for any offense not included specifically in this section if the
court finds at the time of conviction that the person committed
the offense as a result of sexual compulsion or for the purposes
of sexual gratification."228 Furthermore, seizing upon manifest
broad legislative intent, courts have permitted registration and
notification when individuals have only been charged with, but
not convicted of, an enumerated sexual offense.22 Finally, in one
of the most expansive holdings to date, the Connecticut Su-
preme Court concluded that probation officers can carry out
notification with respect to a probationer, notwithstanding that
he pled guilty to a non-enumerated offense.2 0 As a result, the
local school principal, and probationer's neighbors and "fellow
'"Id. at 439. The court noted that it had "some concern over the possibility that this statute
could be extended beyond reason. For instance, would a defendant fall under the provisions of
the KSORA if he or she stole contraceptives or engaged in disorderly conduct by shouting sexu-
ally explicit words?" Id. at 440. See also State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1042 (Kan. 1996) (express-
ing concern that the sweep of the registration requirement "could apparently include any
'sexually motivated' act resulting in an 'offense,'" including non-felonies).
2s SeeWASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.130, 9.94A.127 (West 1997). See also State v. Halstien,
857 P.2d 270, 282 (Wash. 1993) (requiring registration of paperboy who broke into a woman's
home and stole a box of condoms and a vibrator).
n'See IND. CODE § 5-2-12-4(1) (E) (West Supp. 1999).
"See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-412.5 (West 1997). See also, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-1 1-200
(1997) ("act of sexual perversion"); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 272, 290 (West 1997) ("lewd and las-
civious behavior"); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-301 (a) (v) (Michie 1998) ("taking indecent liber-
ties").
G'CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (a) (2) (E) (West 1997).
' See, e.g., People v. Meidinger, 987 P.2d 937, 938-39 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming re-
quired registration of offender who pled guilty to contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a
non-enumerated offense, because of the "underlying circumstances of the offense"). But see
Whitehead v. State, 985 P.2d 1019, 1020 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) (denying right to sentencing
judges to require registration of offenders convicted of non-enumerated offenses); In re C.M.,
578 N.W.2d 391, 399 (Minn. Ct App. 1998) (finding due process violation when notification
permitted when offender charged with, but not convicted of, a sex offense).
See State v. Misiorski, 738 A.2d 595, 602 (Conn. 1999).
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bowling league participants" were provided with sensitive regis-
tration informationY21
Even in the absence of such expansive statutory language or
judicial behavior, jurisdictions have prescribed a broad gamut of
non-violent offenses as sufficient to trigger registration and noti-
fication, targeted juveniles, 3 and at times otherwise failed to
impose a time limit for registration-eligible offenses.2m Exacer-
bating this breadth, states rarely provide registrants a right to
appeal the eligibility determination, 2" and the sole federal ap-
pellate court directly addressing the issue (the Ninth Circuit)
has held that state registrants cannot avail themselves of federal
habeas relief because they are not "in custody" as required by 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a).23 Nor must suspects always be apprised at the
" Id. at 598-600. Compare id. at 604 (Berdon, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority's grant of fas-
cistic powers to probation officers cuts away a pound of flesh from the constitutional right to
privacy.").
"" See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-11-200, 13A-12-131 (1997) (posting obscene bumper sticker);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-8821, 13-1402, 13-1408 (West 1997) (indecent exposure and adul-
tery); CAL PENAL CODE §§ 290, 647(d) (West Supp. 1997) (loitering outside a public restroom
for lewd or lascivious purposes); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:76, 15:542(E) (West 1997) (bigamy);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-11A-3, 30-6A-3 (Michie 1997) (possession of sexually explicit photo of
minor); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.08, 2907.09, 2950.01 (D) (1) (Anderson 1996) (public in-
decency, voyeurism); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-430(C) (12) (1999) ("peeping").
In a case garnering national attention, an 18-year-old Wisconsin boy was prosecuted for hav-
ing consensual relations with his 15-year-old girlfriend, making him subject to registration as a
sex offender. See Roberto Suro, Town Faults Law, WASH. PosT, May 11, 1997, at Al. In a similar
case, in Kansas, a 20-year old male was forced to register as a result of having sex with a 15-year-
old female, who he mistakenly thought was of legal age-because she was drinking beer in a tav-
ern. See Tony Rizzo, Relatives Fall Victim to Sex Laws; Offenders' Families Have Been Harassed By
Taunts and Hate Mai KANSAS Crr STAR, Nov. 1, 1994, at Al (noting that most offenders subject
to registration "are lower-level offenders who received probation rather than prison after they
were convicted"). See also Doe v. Attorney Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007 (Mass. 1997) (holding that
due process must be accorded male who was forced to register upon being convicted for propo-
sitioning an undercover officer in a highway rest area reputedly popular for consensual sex be-
tween adult males); Kevin Simpson, Sex-Case Penalty Questioned, Teenager Suffers as Listed Offende',
DENVER Posr, Aug. 8, 1999, at Bi (discussing 15-year-old boy forced to register as result of fon-
dling female classmate).
"' See, e.g., In re Matter of Welfare of C.D.N., 559 N.W.2d 431, 435 (Minn. 1997); State v.
Haskell, 916 P.2d 366, 372 (Wash. 1996). See generally Earl F. Martin & Marsha K. Pruett, The Ju-
venile Sex Offender and theJuvenileJustice System, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 279, 313-32 (1998); MarkJ.
Swearingen, Comment, Megan '; Law as Applied toJuveniles: Protecting Children at the Expense of Chil-
dren?, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 525 (1997).
..4 See e.g.,Wfliam Clalborne, At the Las Angeles County Fair, 'Outing" Sex Offenders, WASH.
POST, Sept. 20, 1997, at Al (noting that California's sex offender registry includes individuals
convicted decades ago of consensual homosexual acts that are no longer prosecuted).
Se; e.g., People v. Adams, 144 111. 2d 381,387 (Ill. 1991) (no statutory right of appeal).
2 See McNab v. Kok, 170 F.3d 1246, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (construing Oregon law); William-
son v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998) (construing Washington law). Elsewhere
the Ninth Circuit has expressed constitutional concern over the simultaneous denial of a right
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time they enter a guilty plea that they will be subject to registra-
tion and notification,7 on the reasoning that they are "collat-
eral" and not "direct" effects of the plea.
Finally, contrary to the teleological reasoning of the Eastern
District of Michigan and Illinois Court of Appeals in opinions
discussed above, the fact that a particular jurisdiction's regis-
tration and notification scheme does not differentiate among
offenders, and thus relies exclusively upon blanket legislative as-
sessment of community danger, should not alter the liberty in-
terest analysis. The constitutional question is not whether
offender differentiation is contemplated by the particular statu-
tory scheme in question; rather, it is whether a liberty interest
to appeal and recourse to habeas corpus. See Magana-Pizano v. I.N.S. 152 F.3d 1213, 1221-22
(9th Cir. 1998), reu'd on other grounds, 119 S. Ct. 1137 (1999).
2' See Roe v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp. 174, 183 (D. Mass. 1998); Robinson v. State, 730 So. 2d
252, 254 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998); People v. McClellan, 862 P.2d 739 (Cal. 1993); State v. Skroch,
883 P.2d 1256 (Mont. 1994); State v. Timperley, 599 N.W.2d 866, 869 (S.D. 1999); Guzman v.
State, 993 S.W.2d 232, 236 (Tx. CL App. 1999); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1076 (Wash. 1994).
A few courts have found that such a failure to advise undercuts the requisite voluntariness of
the plea. See United States v. Coenen, 135 F.3d 938, 943 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that defendant
was entitled to pre-sentence notice that the court was considering as a condition of supervised
release community notification, likening notification to "upward departure" under U.S. Sen-
tencing Guidelines); State v. Calhoun, 694 So. 2d 909, 914 (La. 1997) (voluntariness of plea un-
dercut by failure to advise defendant of registration and notification requirements). Cf
Peterson v. State, 988 P.2d 109, 119-20 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) (invalidating unadvised plea be-
cause legislature expressly revised guilty plea procedure to guard against same). In In re Birch,
the California Supreme Court set aside a plea for "lewd and lascivious" behavior, based on uri-
nating in public, because the defendant was not advised that he would be required to register as
a sex offender. 515 P.2d 12, 12-13, 17 (Cal. 1973). The Birch court noted that "[a]lthough the
stigma of a short jail sentence should eventually fade, the ignominious badge carried by the
convicted sex offender can remain for a lifetime," and "[w]henever any sex crime occurs in his
area, the registrant may very well be subjected to investigation." Id. at 17.
' See supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
Very recently, the Alaska Court of Appeals used this same reasoning in its rejection of a due
process claim. See Patterson v. State, 985 P.2d 1007 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999). Under Alaska law,
all statutorily eligible offenders are required to provide local police with registration informa-
tion, including name, home address, place of employment, and a photo, which is made available
on the Internet and upon request. The lack of due process afforded to prospective registrants
was of no constitutional moment because:
[petitioner] show[ed] no authority that limits the legislature from providing full access in
all cases. Under [the Act], a sex offender's risk of re-offense is a matter ofjudgment for
any member of the public who uses the Department's registry. The legislature decided
that the fact of an offender's conviction for a sex offense was sufficient reason to include
that offender in the registry because of the potential for re-offense. It is not an irrational
conclusion for the legislature to create the sex offender registry in response to the poten-
tial for recidivism that sex offenders have as a group. Because [the Act] ... does not re-
quire any administrative adjudication, we conclude that [petitioner] has not been deprived
of procedural due process.
Id. at 1017.
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exists sufficient to warrant due process protection. This precise
question was addressed by Massachusetts' highest court in 1997.
In Doe v. Attorney General, 9 the petitioner was convicted of inde-
cent assault and battery, and deemed a "Level 1" offender. As
such, Massachusetts statutory law did not afford him an oppor-
tunity to challenge the requirement that he register, and be sub-
ject to notification on request, for a period of at least 15 years
following conviction.21 The Massachusetts court squarely held
that this violated due process:
It is contrary to the principle of fundamental fairness that underlies
the concept of due process of law to deny the plaintiff a hearing at which
the evidence might show that he is not a threat to children and other
vulnerable persons whom the act seeks to protect and that disclosure is
not needed when balanced against the public need to which the sex of-
fender act responded. Government action stigmatizing the plaintiff
would violate the plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights. The plain-
tiff is entitled to a hearing and a determination as to whether he must
register under the act and, if so, whether sex offender information con-
cerning him should be available on request.241
In short, fundamental fairness dictates that due process
rights be accorded those threatened with notification. The Su-
preme Court itself has stated that procedural due process serves
two central concerns: "the prevention of unjustified or mistaken
deprivations and the promotion of participation and dialogue
by affected individuals in the decision-making process.2 42 Given
the uncertainties associated with the accurate assessment of risk
posed by offenders,243 and the blunderbuss range of offenses
triggering registration and notification,244 fairness requires that
686 N.E.2d 1007 (Mass. 1997).
Id. at 1014. In Opinion of theJstices to the Senate, 668 N.E.2d 738, 753-55 (Mass. 1996), the
court held that Level 3 and 2 offenders were entitled to due process, but did not address the due
process rights of Level 1 offenders. SeeDoe, 686 N.E.2d at 1013 n.9 (noting same).
"4 Id. at 1014. Under Massachusetts law, the following information was provided upon re-
quest: the offender's name, home address, work address, offense and date of adjudication, age,
sex, race, height, weight, eye and hair color, and photograph, if available. See Fanrve, 999 F.
Supp. at 196 n.14.
. Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980). See also Greeholtz v. Inmates of the Ne-
braska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) ("The function of legal process,
as that concept is embodied in the Constitution, and in the realm of factfinding, is to minimize
the risk of erroneous decisions.").
'" See supra note 43 (describing difficulties associated with assessing recidivism risks among
sex offenders).
'4 See supra notes 219-34 and accompanying text (discussing broad statutory eligibility crite-
ria for registration and notification).
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notice and a pre-notification hearing occur so that erroneous
assessments, and their social and monetary costs, can be mini-
mized.2 4 The second due process interest, the benefits of of-
fender participation,246 would also appear amply served, and
have further possible benefits in the form of increasing the like-
lihood that offenders will more fully comply with registra-
tion/notification requirements, if imposed, and even have
therapeutic value.247 Finally, any provision of limited post-
notification review of such inherently stigmatizing action, once
undertaken,248 is not constitutionally sufficient, as repeatedly
made clear by the Supreme Court.
249
" Ironically, over-classification of offenders can conceivably also undercut the capacity, and
willingness, of law enforcement to closely monitor the many offenders compelled to register. See
In re Registrant E.I., 693 A.2d 505, 508 (N.J. Super. Ct App. Div. 1997) ("[flf Megan's Law is
applied literally and mechanically to virtually all sexual offenders, the beneficial purpose of this
law will be impeded."). Cf. NewYork Times Co. v. Sullivan, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart,J.,
concurring) ("[W]hen everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system be-
comes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless."). Indeed,jurisdictions are just now
beginning to feel the economic and personnel strain entailed in broad registration and notifica-
tion schemes. See, e.g., Kay Lazar, States Lack Money, Manpower toDo the Job, BOSTON HERALD,July
19, 1998, at 9, available in LEXIS, News Group File;Jonathan D. Rockoff, Notyication Process of Sex
Offenders Runs into Difficulties, PROVIDENCEJOURNAL, Mar. 28, 1999, at 2.
'
4 SeeTRIBE, supra note 55, § 10-7, at 667 (emphasis in original):
[T]he case for due process protection grows stronger as the identity of the persons affected
by a governmental choice becomes clearer;, and the case becomes stronger still as the pre-
cise nature of the effect on each individual comes more determinedly within the decision-
maker's purview. For when government acts in a way that singles out identifiable
individuals... it activates the special concern about being personally talked to about the
decision rather than simply being dealt with.
247 See Winick, supra note 14, at 565 (noting that "affording offenders an opportunity to par-
ticipate through a hearing process can have significant therapeutic value" and might encourage
a "willingness to accept [the] outcome and to comply with it"). Professor Winick adds that an
evaluative hearing can lessen the self-denial common among sex offenders in that it "will place
sex offenders in the position of advocating that they are amenable to treatment and rehabilita-
tion and that their present risk of reoffending is reduced." Id. at 566. See generally TOM R.
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEYTHE LAw (1990) (discussing the key role of perceived fairness and le-
gitimacy in the likelihood that individuals will follow the law).
244 See Kabat, supra note 46, at 343 (noting that in 29 states registrants enjoy a right to peti-
tion for reconsideration of notification decisions, after notification has occurred, with success
turning on rehabilitation or subsequent decrease in perceived dangerousness).
"' See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 543, 546 (1985) ("An essential
principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty or property 'be preceded by notice
and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.'") (citations omitted).
Post-deprivation hearings, the Court has held, are not to occur except in "extraordinary
situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hear-
ing until after the event." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972) (citing Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)). A post-deprivation hearing is also appropriate when the
government is "unable to anticipate and prevent a random deprivation of a liberty interest."
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990). Given that those subject to notification are either
undergoing prosecutions or on the verge of prison release, neither such exceptional circum-
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V. THINGS TO COME: THE ENDURING AMBIGUrlY OF PAUL AND THE
SHRINKING SPECTRUM OF PROTECTIBLE "LIBERTY'
To date, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed
whether sex offenders possess a liberty interest sufficient to re-
quire that they be afforded procedural due process prior to be-
ing subject to notification.2°  Given the large number of
jurisdictions lacking procedural safeguards, however,25 due pro-
cess challenges are certain to rise with increasing frequency.
Importantly, the federal government, for its part, has adopted
the position that "there is no liberty interest involved in com-
munity notification. 25 2  This view has been endorsed by a sig-
nificant number of courts, most notably the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits,25 ' and is a position echoed by some commentators as
well.
2 5 4
In light of the pendency of the issue, it is important to con-
sider how the Supreme Court itself might resolve the question
of whether sex offenders possess a liberty interest sufficient to
compel due process.
stance would appear to be at play. In short, as the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has
stated with respect to the timing of the notification decision: "[o]nce the plaintiff is harmed, at
best it will not easily be remediable." See Doe v. Attorney Gen., 680 N.E.2d 97, 100 (Mass. 1997).
' The Court has, however, denied certiorari in several cases raising other constitutional
claims against registration and notification. See Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir.
1997), cert. denieA, 118 S. Ct. 1191 (1998); Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1066 (1998); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub. nom. W.P.
v. Verniero, 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998).
"5 See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
". See DENA T. SACCO, Arguments Used to Challenge Notification Laws-and the Govemment's Re-
spons4 in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES, supra note 25, at 50, 51. At the
time of publication, Ms. Sacco served as Counsel in the Office of Policy Development, U.S. De-
partment ofJustice. Ms. Sacco adds:
The laws provide information only. They do not impose any restraint on the of-
fender .... Offenders contend that ... they will be shunned and avoided and denied jobs
and places to live. That is not a State-imposed restraint on liberty because these things are
not requirements of or the intent of notification laws. To the extent that such things even
occur, they are the normal societal consequences of committing a heinous crime.
Id. at 51-52.
" See Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079
(9th Cir. 1997).
'5 See, e.g., Daniel L. Feldman, The "Scarlet Letter Laws" of the 1990s: A Response to the Critics, 60
ALB. L. REV. 1081, 1117 (1997) (arguing that the "stigma-plus" test is not satisfied and that no
liberty interest otherwise exists); McAllister, supra note 163, at 19 ("[It is not] at all obvious pre-
cisely what liberty interest or fundamental right sex offenders have in concealing such informa-
tion. Without a protected liberty interest or fundamental right at stake, the equal protection,
substantive and procedural due process challenges are almost certainly doomed.").
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A. HOW THE COURT WILL APPLY PAUL IS UNCLEAR
While the majority of lower courts that have used Paul to
address the question of whether sex offender notification impli-
cates a liberty interest have answered in the affirmative,25 and
with good reason,26 it remains far from certain how the Su-
preme Court would resolve the issue. 7 Indeed, although the
Paul "stigma-plus" test is over twenty years old, it continues to
perplex courts. As the Second Circuit has stated, "it is not en-
tirely clear what the 'plus' is .... Although Paul is the founda-
tion for all subsequent cases dealing with governmental
defamation, its meaning is not unambiguous. '' s
For instance, although numerous reviewing courts have
deemed the "plus" requirement satisfied by registrants' loss or
infringement ofjob opportunities,29 a close reading of the Paul
facts reveals that, in fact, the plaintiff alleged impairment of fu-
ture employment opportunities, which the Paul majority
deemed non-actionable as a matter of law.26 Construing Paul in
its 1994 decision in Valmonte v. Bane,26' the Second Circuit stated
that the more generalized "deleterious effects which flow di-
rectly from a sullied reputation" do not alone suffice under
PauL262 Such broad consequences:
' See supra notes 139-63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 168-208 and accompanying text.
2' Citing Paul, one U.S. Department ofJustice spokesperson recently stated that "simply la-
beling a person a 'criminal' or making statements that a person committed a particular crime
does not infringe on a constitutional right, even if the information is not true and even if third
parties rely on the information to refuse to employ or rent a residence to that person." See
SACcO, supra note 252, at 52.
Neu v. Corcoran, 869 F.2d 662, 667 (2d Cir. 1989). See also Ersek v. Township of Spring-
field, 102 F.3d 79, 83 n.5 (3d Cir. 1996) (referring to "plus" as "uncertain").
See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
t" See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697 (1976). See also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 234
(1991) (noting same); Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1269 (10th Cir. 1989)
(deeming damage to future employment opportunities as "too intangible"); Tarkanian v. Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 741 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Nev. 1987) ("The stigma which satisfies
the 'stigma-plus' in the employment context must be such that it forecloses plaintiff's employ-
ment to take advantage of other employment opportunities."); Levinsky v. Diamond, 559 A.2d
1073, 1085 (Vt. 1989) (deeming alleged interference with prospective business operations as
"too speculative").
Although the shoplifting charges against Davis were eventually dismissed, five years after the
flyer incident he reported that he was "broke, without employment, emotionally sick and in a
state of anxiety." See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 96, at 100-01 n.85.
2 18 F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1001.
SEX OFFENDERS' LIBERTYINTERESTS
would normally include the impact that defamation might have on job
prospects, or, for that matter, romantic aspirations, friendships, self-
esteem, or any other typical consequences of a bad reputation. When
the Supreme Court stated in Paul v. Davis that injury to reputation was
not by itself a deprivation of a liberty interest, we presume that the Court
included the normal repercussions of a poor reputation within that
characterization.263
In Valmonte, discussed above, appearance on the child abuse
registry placed "a tangible burden" on the plaintiff, rather than
"an intangible deleterious effect that flows from a bad reputa-
don.''2 This was because the New York law in fact imposed an
additional "statutory impediment": it both required that poten-
tial employers consult the registry before hiring the plaintiff,
and imposed the "added burden on employers" of providing a
written justification if they wished to hire her.26 Because notifi-
cation laws impose no such "added burden" on sex offenders,
the very real, but still generalized, diminution in reputation they
suffer in the job market (and society more generally) arguably
does not satisfy the "plus" requirement.26 Moreover, despite
the fact that government carries out the notification, and hence
enables the harm accruing to registrants, difficulties arguably
arise on the basis of decisions holding that the injurious "plus"
must be caused directly by the government, not third parties
such as employers. 267  Finally, while the imposition of an ongo-
ing duty to maintain registry status can be construed as an
'0 Id. See also Siegert, 500 U.S. at 234 ("plus" not satisfied if "damage flows directly from injury
caused by the defendant to a plaintiff's reputation.. ."); Mosrie v. Barry, 718 F.2d 1151, 1162
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (mere adverse public reaction does not constitute "plus").
'" Valmont 18 F.3d at 1001. See also supra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
2' Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1001.
'" The Valmonte court was at pains to emphasize that the registry law posed a "unique situa-
tion" and noted that the Supreme Court has indicated "that perhaps only those who are de-
famed while in the course of being terminated from government employment can state a cause of
action for deprivation of a liberty interest." Id. at 1002 (emphasis added) (citing Siegert, 500 U.S.
at 241-42). Because the registry law required prospective employers to inform potential employ-
ees if they were denied ajob because of inclusion in the registry, the Second Circuit did not "see
much of a difference in the distinction between losing one's established position in government
employment, and losing one's prospective position in government or a government-regulated
field precisely because of the defamation." Id.
In Pau although the plaintiff was not fired as a result of the flyer, he was expressly told by
his supervisor that he "had best not find himself in a similar situation" again. Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 696 (1976).
.'. See, e.g., WMX Tech., Inc. v. Miller, 80 F.3d 1315, 1320 (9th Cir. 1996); Doe v. Kelley, 961
F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (W.D. Mich. 1997); Higginbotham v. King, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114, 118 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1997).
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added "tangible burden, ''26 it is conceivable that the Court
would regard this as a mere regulatory obligation, thus taking it
269
outside due process concern.
Perhaps more problematic, for a governmental action to in-
fringe the "reputation, honor, or integrity" of a person, it ap-
pears that the action must involve a publication that is
substantially and materially false. Without a factual dispute
that "has some bearing on the employee's reputation," the
Court has held, the principal due process relief-a name-
clearing hearing-would serve no useful purpose.271 This of
course raises difficulty with respect to any claim that notification
without notice or opportunity to be heard violates due process,
as the underlying sex crime conviction in itself is not prone to
factual dispute. Thus, arguably due process is not warranted de-
spite the fact that it is the official governmental designation
(e.g., "predator" or "compulsive" sex offender), not the predi-
cate conviction qua conviction, that is so stigmatizing and harm-
ful. 27
2
" See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
"
9 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit intimated as much in its recent holding that a sex offender sub-
ject to registration and community notification was not "in custody" for purposes of federal ha-
beas corpus jurisdiction. SeeWilliamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 824 (1999). The burdens were a "collateral consequence of conviction rather than a
restraint on liberty," and thus were a mere "dvil regulation" akin to the loss of the right to vote,
own firearms, or possess a professional license. Id. at 1183-84 (citing Russell v. Gregoire, 124
F.3d 1079, 1093 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1191 (1998)).
'70 See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627-29 (1977).
27 Id. at 627.
Justice Stevens, dissenting, addressed this concern in Codd, arguing that the majority's
rule ignored the liberty interest in avoiding a "stigma or other disability that forecloses employ-
ment opportunities," which arise even if the basis for the stigma is technically true. Id. at 633 n.3
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Stevens reasoned, it is the "official determination,
based on such information, that the employee is unfit for public employment" that was so dam-
aging. Id. at 633. A similar argument could be made with respect to notification, but would
likely prove equally unsuccessful. See, e.g., Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000, 1012 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App.) (rejecting argument that "sexual predator designation, by itself, infringes on [peti-
tioner's] liberty rights" because law is "non-punitive and remedial in nature"), reh. denied, 722
So. 2d 192 (Fla.), cert. denied; 119 S. Ct. 624 (1998). Cf. Dean v. McWherter, 70 F.3d 43, 45-46
(6th Cir. 1995) (denying liberty interest claim arising out of a legislative finding that sex offend-
ers constitute "a species of mentally ill persons in the eyes of the general assembly...").
In this regard, it bears mention that pre-Paul cases, including Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
conceived of the issue in terms of "stigma," "badge of infamy," or "branding," not defamation.
See RandolphJ. Haines, Note, Reputation, Stigma and Section 1983: The Lessons of Paul v. Davis, 30
STAN. L. REV. 191, 223-25 (1977).
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Finally, although a strong case can be made that both the
"stigma" and "plus" are demonstrably more acute with notifica-
don, compared to the Paul facts, it is quite conceivable that the
Court will conclude otherwise. For instance, in Paul the plain-
tiff, who had been arrested by private store security, not even
police, and had only one prior arrest (for speeding), ultimately
was not even prosecuted.7 3 Sex offender registrants, on the
other hand, typically have been adjudicated guilty, removing
from the analysis the presumption of innocence, which surely
influences any perception of procedural unfairnessY.2 74 Also, the
classification processes used by states to make registration and
notification decisions might not give the Court pause. Indeed,
the Paul majority found solace in the fact that the decision to
brand the plaintiff as an "active shoplifter" was made informally
by local police, not any official adjudicative body, raising a like-
lihood that the Court will similarly find that the compulsory or
otherwise informal, law-enforcement dominated processes used
in most states today will pass muster under Chief Justice
Rehnquist's leadership.275
'r See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 718-19 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Valmonte; dis-
cussed supra, where the Second Circuit found a deprivation of "liberty" in relation to placement
on a child abuse registry, the plaintiff was also ultimately exonerated. SeeValmonte v. Bane, 18
F.3d 992, 1001 (2d Cir. 1994). See also supra notes 261-69 and accompanying text.
"' See Pau4 424 U.S. at 725 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing with respect to the
majority's stance that "[i]t is hard to conceive of a more devastating flouting of the presumption
of innocence. . ."). With apparent disdain for the Paul majority's holding, Justice Brennan
added:
It is inexplicable how the Court can say that a person's status is "altered" when the
State suspends him from school, revokes his driver's license, fires him from ajob, or denies
him the right to purchase a drink of alcohol, but is in no way "altered" when it officially
pins upon him the brand of a criminal, particularly since the Court recognizes how delete-
rious will be the consequences that inevitably flow from its official act.
Id at 734.
' In PauJustice Rehnquist distinguished Jenkins v. McKeithen, where the Court struck down
a Louisiana commission dedicated to the formal branding of citizens as criminals without due
process. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 706 n.4 (discussingJenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969)). By
comparison, the informal evaluative acts undertaken by the police in Paul "f[e] 11 far short of the
more formalized proceedings" that compel due process protections. Id. The police were "not
by any conceivable stretch of the imagination ... 'an agency whose sole or predominant func-
tion, without serving any other public interest, is to expose and publicize the names of persons it
finds guilty of wrongdoing.'" Id. (quotingJenkins, 395 U.S. at 438 (Harlan,J. dissenting)).
Why this relative informality should be significant is unclear. As Justice Brennan tren-
chantly, and presciently, offered in his Pauldissent:
The logical and disturbing corollary of this holding is that no due process infirmities
would inhere in a statute constituting a commission to conduct ex parte trials of individu-
als, so long as the only official judgment pronounced was limited to public condemnation
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None of the foregoing is intended to defend Pau its result,
as Justice Brennan noted in dissent, is "frightening for a free
people, 276 and the majority's distinction of precedent, most no-
tably Constantineau, surely numbers among the worst instances
277
of judicial speciousness. ~In the end, however, while it is ap-
parent that Paul in significant part can be explained by the
Court's fear that a decision in favor of the plaintiff would have
led to a complete federalization of state tort law on the basis of
Section 1983,278 there is little hope that the current Court will
reverse Paul or renounce its fundamentally narrow and positivist
view of liberty. Despite Justice Brennan's caustic surmise in Paul
that "today's decision must surely be a short-lived aberration,,
279
and branding of a person as a Communist, a traitor, an "active murderer," a homosexual,
or any other mark that "merely" carries social opprobrium. The potential of today's deci-
sion is frightening for a free people.
Id. at 721 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
Indeed, regardless of the decision-making mechanism, the fact remains that action by the
sovereign carries a recognized imprimatur. This imprimatur itself "usually implies that the in-
formation at issue has been tried and tested according to the dictates of due process." Shearer
v. Leuenberger, 591 N.W.2d 762, 777 (Neb. 1999) (ConnollyJ., concurring). See also id. (de-
scribing Paulfacts as involving "obviously makeshift postings of local law enforcement").
27'Pau 424 U.S. at 721 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
' See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 55, § 10-11, at 702 ("[Tlhe Court in Constantineau rested its
holding only on the fact that 'a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake
because of what the government is doing to him.' And both Board of Regents v. Roth and Goss v.
Lopez reiterated this formulation of the 'core' interest in reputation.") (citations omitted) (em-
phasis in original). See also Haines, supra note 272, at 217-23 (surveying cases prior to Paul that
"demonstrate the development of a constitutional tort doctrine focusing on governmental stig-
matization").
2'8See Pau4 424 U.S. at 697 (expressing fear that allowing plaintiff's suit under Section 1983
"would seem almost necessarily to result in every legally cognizable injury which may have been
inflicted by a state official ... establishing a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment"). Com-
mentators have noted the same. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 55, § 10-11, at 704; Armacost, supra
note 93, at 576-78; Monaghan, supra note 93, at 423-34. According to Professor Monaghan:
"[T]he pressure to keep [such] cases out of the federal courts was great, and so a compromise
was struck .... [T]he courts struck a compromise at the definitional stage." Id. at 429.
The NewJersey Supreme Court, addressing a non-Section 1983 claim that the State's notifi-
cation law implicated a liberty interest and violated due process, has distinguished Paul on this
basis. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 418 n.26 (NJ. 1995) ("Finding a protectible interest in
this case would not risk federalizing tort law. Plaintiff's claim is not a state defamation action.
We are not dealing here with random disclosures, but with systematic disclosures following ex
parte classification by local prosecutors.").
m'Pau 424 U.S. at 735 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan further worried that in the wake of Paul "[i] t is not difficult to conceive of a
police department ... publishing periodic lists of 'active rapists,' 'active larcenists,' or other
.'known criminals.'" Id. at 721 n.9. In addition to the striking resemblance such a premonition
has to the current registration and notification laws, it is apparent that Pauls constitutional carte
blanche is being taken to heart by local police departments in the very way envisioned by Justice
Brennan. See 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 18, 1996) (featuring Massachusetts police
chief who broadcasts the names and photos of selected arrestees as "punk of the week" or "toilet
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and the questionable need for the Court to render reputation
(i.e., the right to be free of unwarranted official "branding") a
constitutional superfluity, 21° over twenty years later it remains a
guiding precedent in the liberty interest analysis.
B. THE SHRINKING SPECTRUM OF PROTECTIBLE LIBERTY
The question of whether sex offender registrants enjoy a
constitutional right to privacy, as noted above, can play a critical
role in the liberty analysis.281 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit and sev
eral other courts have held that the lack of any protectible pri-
vacy interest against the disclosure of otherwise "public"
information dictates a corollary absence of a protectible federal
liberty interest, ruling out the need for due process.282 On the
other hand, the recognition of such an interest has played a
lynchpin role in the decisions of numerous other courts in favor
of finding that due process must be accorded.283  Although such
courts have a sound basis for their holdings, the trajectory of the
Supreme Court's decisions in recent years makes such a liberty-
affirming outcome unlikely.
24
licking maggots"). Compare Benjamin Weiser, Journalists Fear Ruling Could Hinder Coverage of the
Police, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 27, 1999, at B2 (discussing recent ruling by federal district court that
barred "perp walks" for the benefit of the press, on the rationale that it invaded privacy rights of
suspects).
"' As Professor Barbara Armacost recently noted, "[t]he tort-like quality of the plaintiffs in-
jury in Paul is irrelevant to the question of whether the harm also implicates a constitutional
right." Armacost, supra note 93, at 581. In other words, rather than conceiving of the Paulclaim
as a generic state tort claim, with its implicit "floodgates" concern, the inherent constitutional
quality of the claim in Paulwarranted address. See id. at 575 ("[T] he injury to reputation at issue
in Paulis exactly the kind of claim that ought to be governed by federal constitutional law rather
than state law."). Indeed, courts interpreting Paul have required that an ancillary, already con-
stitutionally protected interest (typically property) be jeopardized for a constitutional claim to
arise. See, e.g., Peters v. Houston, No. Civ. 98-1580, 1999 WL 554581, *13 (E.D. Pa.July 13, 1999)
("[A] property interest conjoined with reputational interests can satisfy the requirements of the
due process clause."); Boylan v. Arruda, 42 F. Supp. 2d 352, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[The added
harm] takes the plaintiff's claim out of the realm of the merely defamatory and transforms it
into a case of truly constitutional dimension."). Given this additional constitutional prerequi-
site, one is obliged to ask why "stigma" is required at all.
"' See supra notes 105-43 and accompanying text. See also Lawrence Alexander, The Relation-
ship Between Procedural Due Proces and Substantive Constitutional Rights, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 323, 324
(1987) ("'[L]ife, liberty, and property' are best thought of as referring to all interests the depri-
vation of which can implicate substantive constitutional values.").
" See supra notes 105-43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 151-62 and accompanying text.
As noted by one commentator:
[E]ven when the Court has confronted problems that most people would categorize under
the general heading of privacy... it has tended to avoid the privacy label when it intended
1220 WAYNE A. LOGAN [Vol. 89
Indeed, although for the better part of the twentieth cen-
tury "liberty" has been expansively defined by the Supreme
Court,285 the Court in recent years has sharply limited the scope
of protectible interests deemed sufficient to trigger due proc-
ess.286 Commentators have concluded that we are in the midst
of a due process "counterrevolution,"287 characterized by an ata-
vistic return to a narrow definition of constitutionally protecti-
ble "liberty. 
'2
The origins of this retrenchment by most accounts are
found in a series of the Court's decisions in the 1970s. In cases
such as Meachum v. Fano,89 Bishop v. Wood,2° and Board of Regents
to uphold the regulation .... [I]n Paul v. Davis, the Court held that an unsullied reputa-
tion was not a specially protected liberty interest by summarily categorizing it as outside the
"right to privacy."
David Crump, How Do the Courts Really Discover Unenumerated Fundamental Rights? Cataloguing the
Methods ofJudicialAlchemy, 19 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 795, 893 (1996) (footnote omitted).
.. In 1923, the Court stated that "liberty":
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life. To acquire useful knowl-
edge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Seven years earlier, in 1916, the Court unequivo-
cally stated that "liberty" "was intended to preserve and protect fundamental rights long recog-
nized under the common law system." Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328,333 (1916).
"' See ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 99, § 17.2, at 7 ("Since 1972 a majority of the justices
have chosen to take quite literally, and restrictively, the concept that due process applies only to
'life, liberty or property.' In recent years the decisions have narrowly construed these terms ...
.'); TRIBE, supra note 55, § 10-10, at 694 (noting the "considerable narrowing of the liberty and
property interests protected by procedural due process"). Numerous other commentators have
noted the same retrenchment. See, e.g., Gelman, supra note 93; Monaghan, supra note 93; Wil-
liam Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property: Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62
CORNEL L. REV. 445 (1977).
' See Pierce, supra note 93. See also Rebecca E. Zietlow, Giving Substance to Process: Countering
the Due Process Counterrevolution, 75 DEN. U. L. REv. 1, 32 (1997) ("In recent years, this country
has undergone a due process counterrevolution, in which courts and legislatures have restricted
the due process rights that they once had expanded thirty years ago.") (footnote omitted).
' See Monaghan, supra note 93, at 411-14 (discussing the Court's evolution away from a
broad view of "liberty" to one predominantly focusing on physical or "locomotion" liberty, last
popular in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). Professor Monaghan persuasively argues
that the retreat from a "latitudinarian approach to 'liberty' and 'property'" stems in large part
from the conservative fear of a proliferation of constitutional claims brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 408. With the Fourteenth Amendment looming, "statutory explication
necessarily becomes constitutional exegesis as well." Id.
427 U.S. 215, 223-24 (1976) (holding that state prisoner has no "liberty" interest in avoid-
ing transfer to a more restrictive prison setting).
'1 426 U.S. 341,348 (1976) (rejecting claim that non-probationary public employee has "lib-
erty" or "property" interest in continued employment).
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v. Roth,2' the Court manifested its preference for narrowness, a
view more recently characterized by the core belief that liberty
encompasses little more than literal "freedom from physical re-
straint."22 At the same time, as Charles Miller had recognized,
due process emphasis has shifted from protecting individual
rights to protecting the community at large. s This general shift
has obvious importance to the evaluation of sex offender notifi-
cation laws, which seek to protect the community by imposing
restraints on registrants-restraints of a distinctly phenomenol-
ogical, if not physical, nature.
Another important trend is the Court's disinclination to ex-
tend due process rights to those already convicted of crimes.
Without question, duly convicted criminal defendants suffer a
diminished expectation of due process rights. As Justice
O'Connor has observed, "[o]nce society has validly convicted
an individual of a crime and therefore established its right to
punish, the demands of due process are reduced accordingly."M
This said, however, the Court's decisions evince a decided ten-
dency to conceive of this already reduced due process expecta-
tion in the narrowest possible terms. 5 For instance, in Meachum
v. Fano,2 a 1976 decision involving a due process challenge to
the adequacy of state procedures pertaining to prisoners' trans-
fer to a more restrictive setting, the Court made clear that, al-
though the "convicted felon does not forfeit all constitutional
"' 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1971) (stating that while "the range of interests protected by proce-
dural due process [is] broad indeed," it is "not infinite").
See e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997) ("[F]reedom from physical re-
straint 'has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.'");
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) ("Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at
the core of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.");
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) ("Liberty from bodily restraint has always been
recognized as the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause."). Compare Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ("[Liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily re-
straint .... ."); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (rejecting idea that liberty em-
braces "only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person").
' See Charles Miller, The Forest of Due Process of Law: The American Constitutional Tradition, in
NOMOS XVIII: DUE PROCESS 3 (J. Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1977).
' Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 429 (1986) (O'ConnorJ., concurring in result in part
and dissenting in part).
Speaking of the counterrevolution, one commentator has singled out prisoners' rights as
an area of due process "terrain" that heretofore "had been fully occupied and fortified by the
revolutionary forces." Pierce, supra note 93, at 1988.
"'427 U.S. 215 (1976).
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protections," 2 7 any generalized liberty a prisoner might have as
to his place of confinement was extinguished upon lawful con-
viction! 8 Likewise, in Connecticut Board of Parsons v. Dumschatm
the Court concluded that a State's refusal to provide a rationale
for its rejection of an inmate's petition to commute his life sen-
tence did not affect a liberty deprivation because the interest at
stake (i.e., against continued confinement) was already extin-
guished. Dumschat labored under "simply a unilateral hope"
that liberty would be restored, which itself is not deserving of
protection. 00
In its 1995 decision in Sandin v. Conner,"'0 the Court held
that inmates are not deprived of a liberty interest when sub-
jected to a thirty-day term in solitary confinement because of
previous "high misconduct." In so doing, the five-member ma-
jority distanced itself from an extended series of decisions over
the preceding twenty years tying liberty to the existence of
prison rules,0 2 concluding that the series had "strayed from the
real concerns undergirding the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause."'0 Liberty, under Sandin, is limited to "freedom
from physical restraint which... [also] imposes atypical or sig-
nificant hardship on the inmate in relation to the normal inci-
dents of prison life."3°4
A case from the Court's 1998 term, Ohio Adult Parole Author-
ity v. Woodard,30 5 especially highlights the Court's narrow con-
ception of post-conviction liberty. In Woodard, the Court
Id. at 225.
Id. at 229.
452 U.S. 458, 461 (1981).
Id. at 465. Compare Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex,
442 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (holding that, in the absence of State law expressly creating such an expec-
tation, availability of parole provides a prisoner "no more than a mere hope that the benefit will
be obtained") with Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,482 (1972) (stating that ex-convicts facing
revocation of parolee status have a protectible "conditional" liberty interest).
515 U.S. 472 (1995). According to Richard Pierce, Sandin was "the first of a series of
counterrevolutionary decisions that will have effects as wide-ranging as those of the revolution-
ary decisions issued between 1970 and 1972 .... By the turn of the century, the due process
revolution of the 197 0s will be relegated to a chapter in a legal history book." See Pierce, supra
note 93, at 1989.
See, e.g., Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989); Hewitt v.
Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983); Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483.
'Id.
'0 118 S. Ct. 1244 (1998).
1222 [Vol. 89
1999] SEX OFFENDERS' LTBERTYINTERESTS 1223
addressed the question of whether an Ohio death row inmate,
whose rights to appeal had been exhausted, was deprived of due
process as a result of the State's clemency procedures.36 Focus-
ing on whether Woodard enjoyed a "life" interest sufficient to
307trigger due process, eight justices concluded that no due pro-
cess violation occurred,"°8 but in a highly fractured plurality
opinion.
Writing for himself and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Tho-
mas, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that Woodard had only a
"unilateral hope" of clemency;0 anything else had been extin-
guished by his conviction and death sentence.3 0 According to
the ChiefJustice, "there is no continuum [of due process rights]
requiring varying levels of process at every conceivable phase of
the criminal system." '' Aside from retaining a very modest "re-
sidual life interest, e.g., in not being summarily executed by
prison guards," 12 any entitlement to due process, once extin-
"' In particular, Woodard claimed that the State's provision of a voluntary clemency inter-
view was improper. Rather than request an interview, as he was directed by the State to do if he
wished one to take place, Woodard instead objected to the short notice of the interview, and
"requested assurances that counsel could attend and participate in the interview" and subse-
quent clemency hearing. Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1249. The Court's focus on "life," given Woodard's impending possible execution,
is both logical and consistent with its view that his "liberty" had been extinguished (even if af-
forded clemency, Woodard would remain in prison). Nevertheless, the Court's focus on "life" is
rare and arguably significant. See Daniel T. Kobil, Due Process in Death Penalty Commutations: Life,
Liberty, and the Pursuit of Clemency, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 201, 217 (1993) ("[T]he Court has omit-
ted mention of the protection of life from most discussions of procedural due process.").
Woodard 118 S. Ct. at 1252 (plurality opinion).
The Court also addressed, and unanimously rejected, Woodard's claim that his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated when he was barred from receiving
immunity for any incriminating statements he might make at a voluntary interview before the
Clemency Authority. Id. at 1253. Writing for the Court, ChiefJustice Rehnquist reasoned that
because the interview was voluntary, the Fifth Amendment's bar against "compelled" self-
incrimination was not applicable. Id. Although it might have been in Woodard's strong self-
interest to have an interview, the State did not force him to do so. Id.
Id. at 1250.
'The Chief'Justice also concluded that the State's clemency procedures themselves did not
create a protectible due process interest. Id. at 1251-52. Despite the mandatory nature of the
procedures, Woodard had only a minimal expectation of clemency, itself undercut by the broad
discretion the Governor enjoyed in the clemency decision. Id at 1251.
"' Id. The ChiefJustice rejected Woodard's claim that such a continuum exists on the basis
of Evitts v. Lucey, where the Court held that criminal defendants have a right to effective assis-
tance of counsel in their first appeal as a matter of right. Id. (discussing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S.
387, 394-96 (1985)). He reasoned that the discretionary nature of clemency differed from the
mandatory right of appeal in Evitts, and concluded that "clemency is [not] an integral part of
Ohio's system of adjudicating the guilt or innocence of the defendant." Id.
"' Id. at 1250.
WAYNE A. LOGAN
guished, can be regained only under limited circumstances. By
way of example, the plurality offered Ford v. Wainwright, where
the Court held that the Eighth Amendment bars execution of
the insane, because the "protected [liberty] interest ... arose
subsequent to trial, and was separate from the life interest al-
ready adjudicated in the inmate's conviction and sentence.
This interest therefore had not been afforded due process pro-
tection."
Justice O'Connor concurred in the result, with Justices
Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer joining her. Although she con-
cluded that the process Woodard received, including notice and
an opportunity to participate in the interview, satisfied due pro-
cess, she and her fellow concurring justices were at pains to state
that "it is incorrect.., to say that a prisoner has been deprived
of all interest in his life before his execution."1 4 Justice Stevens,
the sole dissenter, stated that the Court lacked a sufficient evi-
dentiary record to assess whether due process was afforded, and
adamantly disagreed with the Chief Justice's assertion that
"there is no continuum requiring varying levels of process at
every... phase of the criminal justice system." '
Taken together, the decisions discussed above surely do not
favor any positive determination by the present Court that noti-
fication implicates a protectible liberty interest warranting due
process. The plain disinclination of the Court to conceive of
reputation as a liberty interest,316 the Court's uncertain stance
with respect to any constitutional right to informational pri-
vacy,31 7 and the apparent view of a near-majority of justices that
"there is no continuum [of due process rights] requiring vary-
ing levels of process at every conceivable phase of the criminal
3' Id. at 1250 n.3 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 425 (1986) (Powel, J., concur-
ring)).
31
, Id. at 1254 (O'ConnorJ, concurring) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1254, 1255-56 n.3 (StevensJ, dissenting in part).
" See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1996) ("The words 'liberty' and 'property' as used in
the Fourteenth Amendment do not in terms single out reputation as a candidate for special pro-
tection. .. ."). See also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1991) (noting same); ROTUNDA &
NowAy, supra note 99, § 17.4, at 65 ("One of the most disputed aspects of liberty in recent years
is the degree to which the due process clauses protect the interest of an individual in his reputa-
tion.").
"' See supra notes 56-73 and accompanying text.
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system,"318 all militate against an affirmative finding. Further-
more, although notification profoundly taints the community
standing of targeted individuals, and harms them in manifold
other ways, s19 the fact that notification imposes no physical re
straint per se, makes the procedural due process analysis all the
bleaker.
VI. CONCLUSION
All free societies, most certainly our own, must decide
whether, and to what extent, those they fear are to be accorded
liberties.32 This dilemma is surely evident with respect to sex of-
fenders who, although they have paid their debt to society as a
result of incarceration, remain the subject of profound fear and
disdain.3 21  The proliferation of sex offender notification laws
signifies Americans' clear preference for community protection
at the expense of the liberty interests of sex offenders: the laws
seek to preempt sex crimes by at once branding offenders and
providing information to communities in the putative name of
public safety through self-protection./ Viewed in historical
context, notification laws at once evidence the catalytic effects
of "moral panic," a phenomenon first recognized by sociologist
", Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1251.
That at least four members of the Court should adopt such a narrow view of protectible in-
terest in the context of the death penalty is itself telling. Indeed, true to the "extinction" princi-
ple of the post-conviction right set forth in Dumsdiat and Meadmm, the ChiefJustice apparently
believes that Woodard lost his "life" interest at the moment his death sentence was imposed. See
id. at 1252 n.5.
"' See Roe v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp. 174, 197 (D. Mass. 1998) (characterizing the interest at
stake as one in "avoiding 'the statutory branding of [petitioner] as a public danger,' and its at-
tendant impact on his reputation, employment opportunities, and ability to control the disclo-
sure of personal information").
' Ten years ago one commentator observed: "[a]s America moves into the twenty-first cen-
tury, we must determine to what extent individual liberties must be sacrificed for the common
good. Ideals of liberty and privacy are stretched to the limit as modem fears of street crime
merge with ancient fears of plague." Edward P. Richards, TheJurispnuence of Prevention: The
Right of Societal SeyFDefense Against Dangerous Individuals, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 329, 329
(1989).
' Se4 e.g., 140 Cong. Rec. 11 (statement of U.S. Rep. Susan Molinari) ("[W]e are saying [to
released sex offenders] yes, you then abdicate your civil rights to live a free and normal life, just
like your victim did at the moment that the crime was committed.").
' See Telpner, supra note 14, at 2068 ("The main purpose of these laws cannot be merely to
prevent future crimes. Rather, by denouncing released sex offenders, these laws satisfy the
community's social and emotional need to define itself in away that excludes these offenders.").
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Edwin Sutherland fifty years ago,53 and resemble methods of so-
cial control last employed in the American West of the mid-
1800s. This time, however, we have "unwanted posters"-which
specify where the target of fear resides and perhaps works. 24
Ultimately, the affirmative legislative decision that state and
federal governments have made to require community notifica-
tion may prove a, socially responsible one. Sex offenses indis-
putably cause enormous physical and emotional harm, and
making registrants' identifying information publicly available
apparently provides Americans with some measure of psychic
comfort. But whatever their merits, notification laws do come at
a cost; the highly personal information they convey, and the of-
ficial stigmatization they foster, have obvious and unavoidable
effects on the liberty interests of those targeted-and possibly
for their entire lives. In a society that exalts the "right to be let
alone" as the "right most valued by civilized men,"026 affording
due process prior to community notification would appear a
constitutional certitude. However, given the shrinking spec-
trum of liberty interests identified by the Supreme Court in the
last two decades, and the uncertain outlines of its informational
privacy and reputational interest jurisprudence, it is unlikely
that a majority of the present Court will agree. This is especially
so given the enduring bogeyman status of sex offenders and the
court's historic deference to the police power of states to exer-
cise social control over them.3 z
Nevertheless, an alternative avenue does perhaps exist: state
constitutions-a "font of individual liberties," as Justice Brennan
Edwin H. Sutherland, The Diff[sion of Sexual Psychopath Laws, 56 AM.J. SOC. 142 (1950).
Although Sutherland did not use the phrase "moral panic," his recognition of the "hysteria"
driving sex psychopath laws was instrumental in the conceptualization of the phenomenon. See
Michael Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1728, 1781-
86 (1999) (surveying development of "moral panic" theory).
... See W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199,1217 & n.20 (D. NJ. 1996), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (1997) (noting same).
' As Seth Kreimer has noted: "[n ] o one doubts that Hester Prynne's scarlet letter provided
more than neutral information, or that the effort of SenatorJoseph McCarthy to 'expose' the
background of his political opponents was not simply public education." Seth F. Kreimer, Sun-
light, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Lawt, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1991) (footnote omitted).
"' SeeOlmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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once collectively referred to them.32 8 Although closely related to
their federal counterpart, state constitutions can, and often do,
provide more and different protections to state citizens, s2 in ef-
fect providing a "double security."30
Indeed, state constitutions often contain unique provisions
designed to favor citizens' civil liberties, which on their face
protect "reputation"31 and "privacy,"3 2 or otherwise contain
sweeping provisions that admit of broad interpretation.3 3 This
richness derives as much from the individual historical identities
of states, and their constitutions,ss as from the fundamental
SWilliamJ. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L.
REV. 489, 491 (1977).
' See id. (nbting that state constitutional "protections often extend[] beyond those required
by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law"). See alsoJennifer Friesen, State Courts as
Sources of Constitutional Law: How to Become Independently Wealthy, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1065,
1073 (1997) (citing numerous examples). See generally G. ALAN TARE, UNDERSTANDING STATE
CONSTITUTIONS (1998).
The phrase derives from James Madison who wrote in full:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first
divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allocated to each subdi-
vided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the
rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time
each will be controlled by itself.
The Federalist No. 51, at 164 (James Madison) (Bantam Books ed. 1982). But see Robert M.
Cover, The Uses ofJurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 639, 674-80 (1981) (noting that such redundancy can result in "confirmatory" or "noncon-
firmatory" outcomes).
"' See, e.g., AA CONST. art. I, § 13 ("[Elvery person, for any injury done him, in his lands,
goods, person, or reputation, shall have a remedy by due process of law .... )"; ARK. CONSr. art.
2, § 2 ("All men.., have certain inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are those of...
acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation ... ."); CoNN. CONST. art. I, § 10
("All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. . . ."); DEL. CONST. Preamble ("[AI1l men
have by nature the rights of ... acquiring and protecting reputation and property .... ."); PA.
CONsT. art. I, § 1 ("All men ... have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are
those of... acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation. ...").
m See, eg., MONT. CONsT. art. II, § 10 ("The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-
being of a free society.... "); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 261 (Tenn. Ct App. 1996)
("[T]he right to privacy provided to Tennesseans under our Constitution is in fact more exten-
sive than the corresponding right to privacy provided by the Federal Constitution."). See gener-
ally Ken Gormley & Rhonda G. Hartman, Privacy and the States, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 1279 (1992).
n See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. II, § 4 (extending a fundamental right of "seeking and obtaining
health and happiness"). See also State v. Yoskowitz, 563 A.2d 1, 13-15 (N.J. 1989) (discussing
State's "fairness and rightness" doctrine).
' See George P. Fletcher, Constitutional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 737 (1993) (discussing
the concept of constitutional identity). As New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Judith Kaye
has remarked: "the history that has shaped the values of this State is different in many respects
from that which shaped the consensus in other states, not to mention our nation as a whole.
Many states today espouse cultural values distinctively their own." Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitu-
tionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 ST.JOHN's L. REV. 399,423 (1987).
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animating ideal of federalism itself.sss As one commentator re-
cently noted:
Independent interpretation by state courts of their state constitu-
tions is important because it returns states to their original role of pro-
tecting the rights of the people in their states, fulfills the role of state
courts as interpreters of their state charters and has the potential for in-
creasing the importance of state court contributions to constitutional
discourse where state courts take approaches which differ from federal
constitutional analysis.
Consistent with this perspective, the highest courts of New
Jersey3 17 and Massachusetts 3s have recently invoked their respec-
tive State constitutions to afford procedural protections in the
For similar sentiments expressed by other state appellate jurists see State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d
952, 967 (NJ. 1982) (Handier, J., concurring) ("[D]istinctive and identifiable attributes of a
state government, its laws, and its people justify recourse to the state constitution as an inde-
pendent source for recognizing and protecting individual rights."); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Rein-
carnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. LJ. 951, 965 (1982) (interpretation must take account of a state's
"land, its industry, its people, its history"). See generally A.E. Dick Howard, The Renaissance of State
Constitutional Law, 1 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONsT. L. 1, 14 (1988) ("A state constitution is a fit
place for the people of a state to record their moral values, their definition of justice, their
hopes for the common good."); Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature of State ConstitutionJu-
risprudenc, 30 VAL L. REV. 421, 436-40 (1996) (discussing "meaningful differences" among
states that account for varied constitutional outcomes).
For a vigorous defense of this "values-based" orientation toward state constitutional interpre-
tation see Robert Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REV. 389
(1998).
Although over the past century the federal courts have served as principal guardians of
individual rights, it remains a historical verity that the state constitutions were first in existence,
and at once served as models for the U.S. Constitution and lessened the perceived need for "the
addition of an arguably superfluous Bill of Rights to the Federal Constitution." Ellen A. Peters,
Capacity and Respect: A Perspective on the Historic Role of the State Courts in the Federal System, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1065, 1073 (1998). Indeed, for a significant part of our nation's history, the federal Bill
of Rights was deemed not binding on state courts. See id. at 1075-77 (describing how state courts
during this era stepped in and filled the rights breach for citizens).
5 Rachel A. Van Cleave, State Constitutional Interpretation and Methodology, 28 N.M. L. REV.
199,201 (1998).
' In Doe v. Porit the court found a protectible liberty interest to be at stake under both the
NewJersey and U.S. Constitutions, but under different rationales. 662 A.2d 367 (NJ. 1995). As
for federal law, the Poritz court found the Paul "stigma-plus" test satisfied, with the "plus" being
the privacy invasion attending notification. Id. at 419. The court then turned to the NewJersey
Constitution and inferred that two liberty interests were at risk: privacy and reputation. Signifi-
cantly, under New Jersey constitutional law, there exists "a protectible interest in reputation
without any other tangible loss." Id. (citing cases interpreting Article I, para. I of the NewJersey
Constitution). In words strikingly similar to those used in Constantineau, the court stated:
"Where a person's good name or reputation are at stake because of what the government is do-
ing to that person, we conclude, sufficient constitutional interests are at stake." Id. at 420. See
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
'In Doe v. Attorney General the SupremeJudicial Court found a liberty interest under Article
12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, thus requiring due process before registration
and notification, "without regard to whether such a person has an independent federally pro-
tected liberty or property interest." 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1012, 1013 n.8 (Mass. 1997).
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notification context, when their respective legislatures initially
failed to provide sufficient pre-notification protections!"9 Fed-
eral courts have likewise looked to indigenous state constitu-
tional provisions to discern protectible liberty interests and
require additional pre-notification procedural protections.Y"
In the end, although the question of how sex offenders are
to be handled is initially a legislative prerogative, the judiciary-
and state courts in particular-must inevitability play a central
oversight role in protecting against legislative over-
generalization.m' The current wave of sex offender notification
laws, however, perhaps carries promise for additional constitu-
tional drama. In a palpable effort to inoculate the laws from
constitutional challenge, numerous state legislatures, as part of
their "legislative findings" attending enactment of registration
and notification laws, have expressly stated that registrants have
a "lessened expectation of privacy.", 2 The Florida Legislature,
''Similarly, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has invoked the Remedies Clause of its State
Constitution to infer existence of a liberty interest when the Minnesota notification law granted
officials immunity, thereby satisfying the "plus" requirement of Paul. See In re C.M., 578 N.W.2d
391,397 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). See also supra notes 163, 205-08 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing state constitutional provisions regarding access to courts and remedies).
See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1105 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding protectible liberty inter-
est, based in right to privacy, under NewJersey Constitution); Roe v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp. 174,
196 (D. Mass. 1998) (finding a "protectible liberty interest in privacy and reputation created by
Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights"); Cutshall v. Sundquist, 980 F. Supp. 928,
932 (M.D. Tenn. 1997), reu'd on other grounds, 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding protectible
liberty interest, based in right to privacy, under Tennessee Declaration of Rights and U.S. Con-
stitution).
' Indeed, as Professor Robert Schapiro has recently noted, judicial review of legislative ac-
tion at the state level "rests on stronger textual or historical foundations than its federal ana-
logue." Schapiro, supra note 334, at 429. In contrast to the mere implicit (and historically
controversial) provision of judicial review in the federal constitution, Schapiro observes that
many state constitutions expressly permit judicial invalidation of legislative acts, and that many
states over time have adopted detailed constitutional limits on legislative actions. Id. On this
basis, Schapiro concludes that state courts "do not suffer from the federalism concerns that may
incline federal courts to hesitate in announcing norms that will constrain governmental activity
in all fifty states .... Whatever its status in the federal context,judicial review in the state setting
functions as an integral part of the overall democratic system of [state] government." Id. at 429-
30.
34 See e.g., AA. CODE § 15-20-20.1 (1999) ("The system of registering criminal sex offenders
is a proper exercise of the state's police power .... [Criminal sex offenders] have a reduced ex-
pectation of privacy because of the public's interest in safety and in the effective operation of
government."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-412.5(6.5) (a) (1999) ("The general assembly finds that
persons convicted of offenses involving unlawful sexual behavior have a reduced expectation of
privacy because of the public's interest in public safety."); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 846E-3 (Mi-
chie 1998) ("Relevant information that is necessary to protect the public shall be collected for
purposes of making it available to the general public, and a sex offender shall have a diminished
expectation of privacy in the information."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944-606(2) (West 1998) ("Sexual
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for instance, has stated that reviewing courts have a "duty" to
uphold registration and notification laws, and that a court act-
ing otherwise "unlawfully encroaches on the Legislature's exclu-
sive power to make laws and places at risk significant public
interests of the state."3 5 Putting aside the unseemly nature of
such saber rattling, such legislative pronouncements pose obvi-
ous separation of powers concerns. Whether state courts, in the
Fourth Circuit's words, elect to indulge in "prostrate deference"
to legislative findings, 344 or to embrace their historic oversight
role in our tripartite system, 45 holds promise for additional con-
stitutional drama in the years to come.
6
Today, true to Justice Brandeis's recognition that the states
"serve as a laboratory" for social experimentation, sex of-
fender notification procedural law is in considerable flux, with
jurisdictions employing a variety of approaches. Although per-
haps cheaper than long-term prison, or indefinite "civil" com-
offenders have a reduced expectation of privacy because of the public's interest in public safety
and in the effective operation of government."); LA. CODE ClM. PROC. ANN. art. 15:540(A)
(West 1998) ("Persons found to have committed a sex offense or a crime against a victim who is
a minor have a reduced expectation of privacy because of the public's interest in public safety
and in the effective operation of government."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 581(b) (West Supp.
2000) ("The Legislature finds that sex offenders.., pose a high risk of re-offending after release
from custody. The Legislature further finds that the privacy interest of persons adjudicated
guilty of these crimes is less important than the state's interest in public safety."); TENN. CODE.
ANN. § 40-39-101(b) (3) (4) (1998) ("Persons convicted of these sexual offenses have a reduced
expectation of privacy because of the public's interest in public safety .... In balancing the of-
fender's due process and other rights against the interests of public security, the general assem-
bly finds that releasing information about sexual offenders .. .will further the primary
governmental interest of protecting vulnerable populations from potential harm."). In a nota-
ble instance of largesse, the South Carolina Legislature was at pains to assure that its sex of-
fender laws "are not intended to violate the guaranteed constitutional rights of those who have
violated our nation's laws." See S.C. CODEANN. § 23-3-400 (Law Co-op. 1999).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.24(1) (West 1998). Furthermore, the "Legislature strongly encour-
ages" any agency adversely affected by ajudicial order in the execution of the sex offender laws
"to file a motion in the court that entered such order." Id. § 775-24(3).
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 847 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), ced.
granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
' The Louisiana Constitution, for instance, expressly prohibits any branch from exercising
power vested in another. SeeLA. CONST. art II, § 2.
"6 As Professor Helen Hershkoff has observed, "[Elven if one assumes that state legislatures
are better equipped at fact-gathering than are state courts, it does not follow that legislatures are
better positioned to use the information that they collect to achieve constitutional goals." Helen
Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 1131, 1179 (1999). Indeed, there is sound reason to dispute the accuracy and reliability
of the social scientific data ostensibly relied upon by legislatures to single out sex offenders as
special recidivism threats. See supra note 43 (discussing uncertainty among researchers relative
to rates of sex offender recidivism).
" New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
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mitment, registration and notification are not "cost-free"; if
American jurisdictions desire to subject sex offenders to poten-
tial life-long stigmatization, and deprive them of privacy in kind,
these ends must be achieved with due regard to the very sub-
stantial liberty interest at stake.8  For although sex offenders
indisputably warrant our disdain, they just as assuredly are enti-
tled to the mantle of due process protections afforded by state
and federal constitutions.
'As the Supreme Court observed over twenty-five years ago, "[pirocedure by presumption
is always cheaper and easier than individualized determination. But when ... the procedure
forecloses the determinative issues... when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference
to past formalities .... [i]t... cannot stand." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972).
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